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Abstract 
In Opinion 2/15, the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council, and the Member States 
litigate whether the Union is exclusively competent to conclude the EU-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement (EUSFTA) alone, or whether the EU ought to involve the Member States as independent 
parties to a ‘mixed’ agreement. The delineation of the scope of EU Common Commercial Policy 
following the Lisbon Treaty reform of 2009 is central to this proceeding. The Court’s opinion, which 
stands in the tradition of seminal EU external competence cases such as Opinion 1/78 and Opinion 
1/94, will further clarify the Union’s constitutional identity in the area of EU external economic 
relations and is likely to have vast implications for EU external economic governance. This note, first, 
reviews the evolution of the Union’s Common Commercial Policy in context of the Court’s past 
jurisprudence and, secondly, scrutinizes the relevant methodological approaches and standards of 
analysis, which the Court employs in its competence enquiry. It is argued that the Court retains ample 
space for discretionary judicial decision-making, which surfaces, most obviously, at the intersection of 
the competence enquiry and the necessary determination of the appropriate legal bases. The 
clarification and further refinement of the Court’s analytical standards in its judgment as well as their 
transparent and consistent application have the potential to substantially reduce incentives for future 
litigation and inter-institutional political combat. The recent quarrels over the signing, provisional 
application, and conclusion of CETA provide sufficient emphasis to this point. Using the legal view of 
Advocate General as a benchmark, this paper, third, discusses the practical implications of the Court’s 
judgment for EU international trade and investment treaty-making. The article, fourth, proposes a 
number of institutional alternatives that may serve to ‘save’ EU external economic treaty-making from 
‘mixity’ and the pitfalls of the associated treaty-making procedures in the EU and the member states. 
Keywords 
Opinion 2/15, Common Commercial Policy, EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, mixed agreements, 
exclusive competence, implied powers. 
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I. Introduction* 
On December 21, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) published the legal view of CJEU Advocate 
General (AG) Sharpston as part of the Opinion 2/15 proceedings.
1
 AG Sharpston’s opinion responds 
to the question to the Court of whether the EU has the ‘requisite competence’ to conclude the EU-
Singapore Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA) alone and without including the Member States (MS) as 
independent parties to the treaty. The Commission had requested the Court’s opinion on this matter 
pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU in October 2014.
2
 More specifically, the Commission asked the 
Court to clarify which parts of the EUSFTA fall within the realm EU exclusive competence; 
competences shared with the member states; or even MS exclusive competences, respectively.
3
 In her 
submission to the Court, Advocate General Sharpston argues that certain parts of the EUSFTA fall 
under EU shared competence – including certain transport services, portfolio investment, labour rights 
and environmental protection obligations - whereas one provision, in her view, falls within the scope 
of exclusive competence of the member states. According to AG Sharpston, the EUSFTA hence ought 
to be concluded as a ‘mixed agreement’ by the EU and its member states independently. The Court is 
expected to issue its opinion on May 16 of this year. Against this background, this note aims at 
reviewing the constitutional fundamentals of the questions that are at stake in this important 
proceeding and outlines the practical implications of the Court’s judgment.  
This paper is divided in two parts. The first part scrutinizes the relevant methodological approaches 
and standards of analysis, which the Court employs in its response to the Commission’s competence 
enquiry. Based on the examination of relevant case law, it is argued that the Court retains ample space 
for discretionary judicial decision-making, which surfaces in the delimitation of the substantive scope 
of the Common Commercial Policy; at the intersection of the competence enquiry and the necessary 
legal basis analysis; as well as in the Court’s reading of implied powers. It is desirable, against this 
background, that the Court renders its choice of analytical parameters and benchmarks transparent – 
or: inter-subjectively verifiable - so as to advance systemic clarity in regard of the unresolved question 
over the delimitation of EU external competence for the CCP and other external policies beyond the 
specific issues addressed in Opinion 2/15. It is in this way that the Court could profoundly minimize 
the legal-institutional incentives for future litigation and inter-institutional political battles over both 
external competences and the appropriate legal bases for external economic treaty making. 
With these methodological considerations in mind, the second part of this paper examines key 
aspects of the legal view of Advocate General Eleonor Sharpston and points at contentious issues that 
may still be subject to further clarification by the Court. Using the legal view of Advocate General as a 
benchmark, this note discusses the practical implications of the Court’s judgment for EU international 
trade and investment treaty-making. Finally, the paper proposes a number of institutional alternatives 
that may serve to ‘save’ EU external economic treaty-making from ‘mixity’ and the pitfalls of the 
associated treaty-making procedures in the EU and the member states. 
                                                     
*
 I am grateful to Petros Mavroidis, Gesa Kübek, Lorand Bartels, and Hannes Lenk for comments and inspiring 
discussions. Opinions expressed here and remaining errors are my own. 
1
 Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston delivered on 21 December 2016; Opinion Procedure 2/15 initiated following a 
request made by the European Commission. 
2
 Request for an opinion submitted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (Opinion 2/15) 
(2015/C 363/22), November 3, 2015. 
3
 ibid.: “Question submitted to the Court: Does the Union have the requisite competence to sign and conclude alone the 
Free Trade Agreement with Singapore? More specifically: Which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union’s 
exclusive competence? Which provisions of the agreement fall within the Union’s shared competence? and Is there any 
provision of the agreement that falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States?” 
David Kleimann 
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The remainder of this introductory section reviews the constitutional evolution of the Union’s 
Common Commercial Policy in context of the Court’s jurisprudence, as well as changing patterns of 
international trade and trade regulation. Section II, subsequently, introduces and scrutinizes four main 
standards of analysis, which the Court and the AG employ in this proceeding to address the 
Commission’s competence enquiry. Section III outlines and discusses the specific legal arguments of 
the AG with respect to those parts of the EUSFTA that fall, in her view, within the scope of exclusive 
Member States competence, exclusive EU competence, and shared competences respectively. In this 
section, moreover, I outline institutional alternatives – in terms of the design of EU commercial 
agreements with third countries – that may avoid the pitfalls of mixed economic treaty-making. 
Section IV offers conclusions drawn from the forgoing analysis.
4
 
1. Background: Institutional Change in EU External Economic Governance 
It is clear that the political weight of the question over the existence and nature of EU external 
competence derives from its link to the procedural modalities of treaty-making in the EU. EU external 
treaty making procedures are the very function of the answer to the question over the nature of EU 
competence: If the content of a treaty falls within the scope of EU exclusive competence entirely, the 
conclusion of the treaty by the EU alone is a legal requirement (‘EU-only’). In contrast, where an 
agreement includes (just) a single provision that falls within the scope of exclusive competences of the 
member states, the EU must conclude the treaty jointly with the member states (mandatory ‘mixed’ 
agreement). If, however, parts of the treaty fall under EU exclusive competence, whereas other parts 
of the treaty fall under competences shared with the member states, it is left to the political discretion 
of the EU institutions to involve the member states as independent parties or conclude the treaty alone 
(facultative agreement).
5
 
Since the entry into force of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, a number of consecutive treaty amendments 
have considerably broadened the scope of the primary law provisions governing Common Commercial 
Policy. The evolution of CCP Article 113 EEC Treaty, over Article 133 EC Treaty to, eventually, 
Article 207 TFEU reflects the efforts of the treaty drafters to adapt the ambit of the CCP to changing 
patterns in international trade over the past six decades. The treaty reforms reflect the demand for a 
sufficiently wide constitutional framework that enables mandated political institutions to respond to 
                                                     
4
 It is worth taking note of two important issues, at this point, which the AG explicitly carved out from the scope of her 
analysis. First, the Commission did not ask the Court to assess the compatibility of the EUSFTAs ISDS mechanism with 
EU law. The Belgian government, however, has recently indicated its intention to ask the Court for clarification of this 
issue in regard of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism that forms part of EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). A second question that remains unaddressed – unfortunately - is whether the 
Commission would be in breach of its institutional obligations under Article 218(4) TFEU and Article 13(2) TEU by 
negotiating the EUSFTA as an ‘EU-only’ agreement despite the fact the Council’s negotiation directive called for the 
negotiation of a mixed agreement. The underlying issue is whether the Council can force the Commission to include 
treaty content that falls under shared or even MS exclusive competence and thus retains the right or must involve the 
member states as independent parties to the agreement. For a detailed discussion of this question, see: Kuiper, Pieter-Jan: 
Post-CETA - How we got there and how to go on. BlogActiv, October 28, 2016.  
5
 In his recent submission in the Opinion 3/15 proceedings, Advocate General Wahl recalled that “the choice between a 
mixed agreement or an EU-only agreement, when the subject matter of the agreement falls within an area of shared 
competence (or of parallel competence), is generally a matter for the discretion of the EU legislature. That decision, as it 
is predominantly political in nature, may be subject to only limited judicial review.” (Opinion 3/15: Opinion of the 
Advocate General Wahl. Para 119, 120) Such discretion, however, is subject to procedural rules laid down in Article 218 
TFEU: The Commission may propose the signing and conclusion of an external agreement as ‘EU-only’. Member states 
represented in the Council can then decide to authorize the signature and conclude the treaty as an EU-only agreement by 
qualified majority voting (QMV), if TFEU-based unanimity requirements do not apply. Alternatively, the Council may 
adopt a unanimous decision to amend the Commission proposal for an ‘EU-only’ agreement and mandate the 
independent ratification by each and every member state - in addition to the Council decision on treaty signature and 
conclusion (Article 293(1) TFEU). 
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opportunities and challenges of what has been prominently termed ‘21st century trade’ by Richard 
Baldwin. Baldwin notes that, “[in the 20th century], trade mostly meant selling goods made in a factory 
in one nation to a customer in another. Simple trade needed simple rules. (…) Today’s trade is 
radically more complex. The ICT revolution fostered an internationalization of supply chains, and this 
in turn created the ‘trade-investment-services nexus’ at the heart of so much of today’s international 
commerce.”6 
It is by no coincidence, therefore, that the CCP initially only extended to basic border measures for 
trade in goods.
7
 Consecutive reforms of the primary law provisions through the treaties of 
Amsterdam
8
, Nice
9
, and Lisbon
10
 have widened the scope of the CCP to cover a larger amount of 
policy instruments that affect external trade in goods and services as well as foreign direct investment 
at the border and beyond. The 1957 Treaty of Rome originally designed the CCP with a view to 
providing the Community with exclusive powers to establish the Common External Tariff, to enter 
into external negotiations over obligations that mutually reduce import duties and quantitative import 
restrictions within the GATT framework, and to adopt autonomous measures that define the 
framework of its external commercial policy. At the early stage of the evolution of this purely external 
area of EU competence, the judges in Luxembourg were confronted with the question whether the 
CCP merely extended to trade liberalization or could also encompass the regulation of international 
commodity trade. 
In Opinion 1/78, the Court opted for a markedly dynamic interpretation of the scope of the CCP. 
More than two decades after the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome, the Court held that 
 “it would no longer be possible to carry on any worthwhile common commercial policy if the 
Community were not in a position to avail itself also of more elaborate means devised with a view 
to furthering the development of international trade. It is therefore not possible to lay down, for 
Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, an interpretation the effect of which would be to restrict the 
common commercial policy to the use of instruments intended to have an effect only on the 
traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of more highly developed mechanisms such as 
appear in the agreement envisaged. A "commercial policy" understood in that sense would be 
destined to become nugatory in the course of time.”
11
 
Rather than being subject to a dynamic judge-made expansion, however, it was consecutive treaty 
amendments, which progressively adapted the CCP to match the needs of EU external action in the 
WTO and then further broadened its scope to cover ‘new generation’ trade policy areas. The 1997 
Treaty of Amsterdam saw the addition of ‘services’ and ‘commercial aspects of intellectual property 
rights’ to the general scope of the CCP. The 2001 Treaty of Nice placed those concepts within the 
                                                     
6
 Baldwin, Richard: 21st Century Regionalism: Filling the gap between 21st century trade and 20th century trade rules, 
World Trade Organization, 2011. p3 
7
 The original version of CCP Article 113(1) of the 1957 Treaty Establishing the European Community reads: “The 
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies.”  
8
 For a contextualization of Amsterdam Treaty amendments in ECJ jurisprudence and treaty negotiation see: Cremona, 
Marise (2001): EC External Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and Interpretation within Interconnected 
Legal Orders, in: Weiler, JHHW (ed): ‘The EU, the WTO, and the NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International 
Trade?’.  
9
 For a comprehensive description and discussion of the Nice treaty amendments, see Herrmann, Christoph (2002): 
Common Commercial Policy after Nice: Sisyphus would have done a Better Job, Common Market Law Review 39, 7-29, 
2002. 
10
 Krajewski, Markus (2012): The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy, in: Biondi, Andrea, Piet Eeckhout, and 
Stefanie Ripley (eds): EU Law after Lisbon, CUP. 
11
 Opinion 1/78 [1979 ECR 2871]. para 44 
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realm of the Common Commercial Policy competence of the Community, subject to a complex web of 
restrictions. The latest EU primary law reform - the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon - considerably consolidated 
and simplified the CCP provisions and amended its scope to include ‘foreign direct investment’.12 
Whether the content of the ‘new generation’ of external economic agreements matches or exceeds 
the scope of the CCP and thus Union exclusive powers over treaty-making is the very question that 
stands at the centre of the Opinion 2/15 proceedings. It is of particular concern here whether the 
Union’s exclusive treaty-making competences extend to the entirety of EUSFTA obligations including 
portfolio investment, transport services, as well as to the non-commercial provisions of the agreement 
such as ‘moral rights’ of intellectual property holders and the EUSFTA chapter on ‘sustainable 
development’ (labour rights and environment protection). 
As predicted by the Court in 1/78 and retrospectively observed by Baldwin, the changing nature 
and increasing complexity of international trade and investment patterns in the past decades has 
generated a demand for a constitutional framework that adapts the powers of the Community (and 
Union) institutions to engage in the regulation of its external economic environment. The profit and 
net welfare enhancing potential of commercial opportunities inherent to international trade as well as 
the evolving complementary international legal institutions that have facilitated and regulated 
international commercial transactions have further driven the demand for reform of primary legal 
institutions governing the EU’s Common Commercial Policy. 
The otherwise rare exclusive nature of EU competence for the CCP as well as the vagueness of its 
provisions with respect to its material scope and purpose(s),
13
 has, however, provided strong 
incentives for political and judicial conflict over the operation of the CCP. It is in this context, that the 
interplay between policy demand generated by international economic and legal institutions; the inter-
institutional political process at the Community level; primary law reform; and CJEU litigation has 
created a dynamic of constructive tension. It is this interplay, which has catalysed as well as 
constrained incremental progress towards an expansion of the scope within which EU unity in external 
commercial policy remains an a priori possibility, as well as towards greater legal clarity over the 
operation of the CCP provisions. 
That being said, it is remarkable that the essence of the legal questions over the operation of the 
CCP has only marginally changed – or rather: been refined - over the past decades. The arguably most 
important issue for the Court remains the quest for a consistent and coherently applied method that 
serves to delineate the material scope of the CCP – and thus: Union exclusive competence - in 
isolation; in relation to other areas of external relations competences; and in relation to areas of EU 
internal competences.
14
 Moreover, the enquiry concerning the Union competences for the conclusion 
of a comprehensive international trade agreement invites the Court to measure the status quo of the 
implied exclusive external competences that the Union has acquired as a result of its constantly 
evolving secondary legislation in areas of shared internal competence. Closely related to competence 
enquiries, third, stands the question over the choice of appropriate legal basis – or bases - for ‘multi-
purpose’ external agreements. The question over the correct legal basis for the act concluding the 
EUSFTA has not been posed to the Court in the Commission’s request for Opinion 2/15. Nonetheless, 
the Court, ought to address the issue as a matter of practical necessity in order to ground distinctions 
                                                     
12
 CCP Article 207 (1) TFEU now reads: “The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods 
and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in the event 
of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and 
objectives of the Union's external action.” 
13
 Cremona, Marise (2001): op. cit. n8. p6 
14
 Cremona, Marise (2001): op. cit. n8. p6, p20 
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between exclusive and shared competences on appropriate treaty provisions. Whether the Court, for 
the purpose of its competence analysis, applies the same analytical standards it employs for pure legal 
basis cases – and thus advances coherence in this regard – is another question of constitutional 
significance that could be clarified in this proceeding. Further down the road, it is the scope of 
responsibilities of the political institutions – or horizontal competences - that will be clarified by 
implication. 
Against this background, a two decades old observation made by Meinhard Hilf may still be as 
relevant as ever: “The lack of clarity as to the extent of foreign trade authority could pose the currently 
most important constitutional problem of the Union” (notwithstanding Brexit).15 It is, in part, the 
purpose of this note to examine discernable progress that has been made over those two decades and to 
draw attention to specific and systemic legal questions that the Court ought to address in its Opinion 
2/15 judgment. 
As indicated in the forgoing paragraphs, Opinion 2/15 stands in tradition of the strand of 
jurisprudence, in which the Commission seeks to clarify the scope of EU (or Community) exclusive 
competence for its external commercial policy. Most prominently, in Opinion 1/94, the Commission 
requested a Court opinion on whether the Community was exclusively competent to conclude the 
WTO Agreement and its annexes under CCP Article 113 EC Treaty.
16
 In contrast to the Commission’s 
view, the Court held that trade in certain services and intellectual property rights provisions under the 
TRIPs agreement were not covered by EU exclusive competence for the CCP but fell under 
competences shared with the member states. The Court thereby ‘enabled mixity’ and allowed for the 
exercise of external competence by member states as independent parties to the 1994 WTO 
Agreement, which thus required the ratification of the said agreement by all member states of the 
Community. In Opinion 1/94, the Court was arguably concerned with setting limits to the CCP in light 
of the nature of corresponding internal competences and shied away from advancing the dynamic 
interpretative approach, which the Court had chosen in Opinion 1/78 two decades earlier.  
As argued elsewhere in greater detail, the Court’s findings in Opinion 2/15 are not only set to 
authoritatively clarify the de jure legitimacy of EU external action in the area of trade and investment 
and thus provide legal certainty over the treaty-making competences of the Union under the post-
Lisbon primary legal framework. Seen in context of past political and judicial battles over 
competence, the Court’s judgment may have a significant bearing on the effectiveness, credibility, and 
efficiency of multilevel governance of EU external economic relations.
17
 What is at stake, to use the 
language of EU constitutional lawyers, is nothing less than the shape and strength of the Union’s 
identity in its external commercial relations and the reach of the member states in EU external 
economic relations conduct. 
Yet, as Advocate General Sharpston recalls, “the need for unity and rapidity of EU external action 
and the difficulties which might arise if the European Union and the Member States have to participate 
jointly in the conclusion and implementation of an international agreement cannot affect the question 
who has competence to conclude it. That question is to be resolved exclusively on the basis of the 
treaties.”18 
                                                     
15
 Cited by Cremona, Marise (2001): ibid.: p6 Hilf, Meinhard (1997): Unwritten EC Authority in Foreign Trade Law (1997) 
2 European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 4, p 437 
16
 Opinion 1/94 [1994 ECR I-5267]. 
17
 Kleimann, David and Gesa Kübek: The Signing, Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and Investment 
Agreements in the EU - The Case of CETA and Opinion 2/15, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research 
Paper No RSCAS 2016/58, November 2016. 
18
 Opinion of the AG Sharpston: para 566. This view mirrors the general and natural stance of the ECJ, as expressed 
elsewhere, such as Opinion 1/94: para 107 and Opinion 2/00: para 41. 
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The AG, of course, rightly suggests here that there is only one legitimate answer to the question of 
competence – notably the one that finds its basis in the authoritative interpretation of EU treaties by 
the Court. It is similarly obvious, however, that the methodological choices of the Court in interpreting 
the treaties are inherently normative and therefore political.
19
 The more important questions may well 
be whether such choices are made in an intersubjectively verifiable manner, whether they are 
systematically coherent within the context of – or in explicit distinction from - the Court’s past 
jurisprudence, and whether they are consistent within themselves. 
Whatever the outcome, in any case, the Court’s findings will yield important guidance for the 
treaty-making practice of EU institutions.
20
 Whether the judgment serves to reduce or eliminate 
prevalent legal-institutional incentives for political and judicial combat between those EU institutions 
and the member states, however, much depends on whether the Court will offer additional clarity over 
its methodological approaches for the delimitation of the CCP vis-à-vis other external competences 
and internal competences as well as over the attribution of legal bases for acts concluding EU external 
economic treaties. It is in this way that the Opinion 2/15 proceedings do not only offer the Court the 
opportunity to guide the parties involved on the question of competence, but also to update and clarify 
the methods it employs to address the questions before it. 
II. Standards of Analysis: Text, Aims and Content, Predominant Purpose, and Implied 
Powers 
The Court’s case law, read in context of the Treaties, provide for four main standards of analysis that 
are relevant for the determination of the existence and nature of EU competence for the conclusion of 
external agreements. The application of these interpretative approaches in Opinion 2/15 may or may 
not result in a finding that the Union has acquired exclusive external competence over the content of 
the EUSFTA. Conceptual clarity and a consistent application of interpretative modalities to the legal 
act in question are certainly crucial ingredients for coherent reasoning and legal certainty beyond the 
legal facts at stake in this proceeding. This section outlines and discusses the main analytical 
approaches, which the AG and the Court employ. I shall turn to an examination of the key substantive 
arguments advanced by the AG in section III. 
1. Ordinary Meaning of the Terms of Article 207(1) TFEU 
The first approach, to be sure, relies on a textual interpretation of the terms of Article 207(1) and 
Article 206 TFEU read in conjunction with Article 2(1) and Article 3(1)(e) TFEU, which render the 
EU exclusively competent to adopt legal acts falling within the scope of Common Commercial Policy. 
Article 207(1) TFEU reads as follows: 
‘The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to 
changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in goods and 
services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, foreign direct investment, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect 
trade such as those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. The common commercial 
policy shall be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external 
action’ [emphasis added]. 
                                                     
19
 There is no need or space to enter into a discussion of this matter here. It may suffice to refer to Koskenniemi, Martti: 
Symposium on Method in International Law, Letter to the Editors of the Symposium, 93 American Journal of 
International Law, 351 April, 1999. 
20
 For EU Commissioner for External Trade, Cecilia Malmstrom, “it’s not about winning or loosing in Court. It’s about 
clarification. What is mixed? What is not mixed? And then we can design our trade agreements accordingly.” Financial 
Times: Brussels Close to Trade Deal with Japan, 4 December 2016. 
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Whether or not treaty content falls within the scope of Article 207 TFEU – and thus EU exclusive 
competence - depends on the conceptual ambit of these provisions, which is indicated by the ordinary 
meaning of their terms. It is widely acknowledged, however, that the list of regulatory areas and 
instruments included in Article 207(1) TFEU is non-exhaustive. It is rather indicative of the scope and 
limits of the CCP. It is arguably the very vagueness of its terms and the indeterminacy of its limits - in 
combination with the (otherwise rare) exclusive nature of EU competence - which has provoked the 
litigious sentiments of EU institutions and member states’ governments over the past decades. It is in 
this context that the CCP has attracted a multitude of CJEU disputes over competence and choice of 
appropriate legal basis. 
In Opinion 2/15, the Court is asked for the first time – among others - to determine the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘foreign direct investment’ within the context of the CCP, which was added to the 
scope of Article 207(1) TFEU as a result of the Lisbon Treaty reform of 2009. Moreover, in this 
proceeding, the Court ought to address the conceptual distinctions between commercial and non-
commercial aspects of intellectual property rights and is required to draw a clear line between the 
wider concept of services trade and the scope of ‘transport’ services. The latter is explicitly excluded 
from the scope of Article 207(1) TFEU by means of a carve-out codified in Article 207(5) TFEU.
21
 
Moreover, the Court will have to examine whether the ordinary meaning of the term ‘restrictions’ in 
206(1) TFEU applies to market access for investment only, or, in line with an inferential reading of the 
term, encompasses post-admission standards of protection, too.
22
 
2. ‘Aim and Content’ of EU External Agreements 
A mere textual interpretation of Article 207(1) TFEU in light of any given content of international 
agreements is, however, not sufficiently conclusive for the delineation of the scope of the CCP and 
other legal bases. The Court’s jurisprudence gives further guidance to the extent that  
“the choice of the legal basis of a European Union act, including an act adopted to conclude an 
international agreement […], must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, which 
include the aim and content of that measure” [emphasis added].
23
 
The ‘aim and content’ approach, as further developed by the Court, prescribes a purposive 
interpretation of the act or measure in question, in light of the material scope of Article 207 TFEU. In 
elaboration, the Court held that  
“a European Union act falls within the common commercial policy if it relates specifically to 
international trade in that it is essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade and has 
direct and immediate effects on trade” [emphasis added].
24
  
By distinction, the Court held  
“that the mere fact that an act of the European Union, such as an agreement concluded by it, is 
liable to have implications for international trade is not enough”  
for it to fall within the scope of Article 207 TFEU.
25
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The application of the ‘immediate and direct effects’ standard to post-Lisbon Common Commercial 
Policy in Daiichi Sankyo has been praised as the Court’s choice of “clarity over caution”.26 Despite 
this commendable development in the Court’s jurisprudence it remains questionable, however, 
whether the Court’s method for testing ‘immediate and direct effects on international trade’, in 
contrast to mere ‘implications’, does in fact reduce the discretion exercised by the Court to delineate 
the material scope of CCP Article 207 TFEU. A purely notional examination of the quality of the link 
between aims and content of an agreement, on the one side, and trade (or foreign direct investment), 
on the other, may in fact provide for little additional clarity beyond the intrinsic value of authoritative 
judicial decision-making. The Court’s self-imposed requirement to determine the correct legal basis on 
the grounds of ‘objective factors amenable to judicial review’ may legitimately generate a demand for 
empirical evidence that adds meaning to these otherwise abstract relationships.  
It seems that the Court has done little to operationalize – through economics-based analysis - the 
relationship between the content of an agreement, the specific measures it requires as a function of its 
obligations, and their effects (whether direct and immediate or by implication) on international trade 
and investment. This circumstance is problematic for both the determination of the appropriate legal 
basis for an act concluding an external agreement and, similarly, for the delineation of competence for 
the CCP, other areas of external action, and fields of internal competence. As demonstrated below, the 
Court was frequently satisfied by mere reference to preambular language of the agreement in question 
or objectives set out in its provisions, in order to determine the purpose of the said agreement within 
the context of the EU primary legal framework – rather than entering into an examination and 
comparison of actual effects of specific measures on the objectives pursued. 
Admittedly, however, this task may make for a mission impossible for the Court. Creating a 
meaningful and empirically robust distinctions between measures that evidently have direct and 
immediate effects on trade versus measures that affect trade by implication could, given the state of 
regional and global economic integration and the corresponding regulatory environment, lead to no 
satisfactory outcome in terms of additional clarity after all. Accepting indeterminacy of the scope of 
the CCP, however, reveals the discretionary space of manoeuvre of the Court to interpret the notion of 
‘direct and immediate effects on international trade’ as it deems fit on a case-by-case basis. 
a.) ‘Aim and Content’ in Opinion 1/94 versus Daiichi Sankyo 
To illustrate this point, we can recall the Court’s approach and reasoning in Opinion 1/94 on the 
question whether the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), on the one hand, and the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), on the other, fall within the scope of (then) 
CCP Article 113 EC Treaty, and whether these individual parts of the WTO Agreement were thus 
subject to exclusive treaty-making competence of the Community, or not. 
Neither ‘agriculture’ nor ‘intellectual property rights’, to begin with, formed part of the terms of 
Article 113(1) EC Treaty. The Union’s internal competences for ‘agriculture’ and ‘intellectual 
property rights’ were (and still are) shared with the member states under the primary law provisions on 
agriculture (Article 43 EC Treaty) and the internal market (Articles 26, 100; 100a EC Treaty). 
Having said this, it is abundantly evident that both the AoA and the TRIPs agreement exert effects 
on both EU internal and external trade and, moreover, required implementing legislation by the 
Community on the basis of policies set out in the treaties for which the Community shares competence 
with the member states. Whether the effects on international trade are deemed to be ‘immediate and 
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direct’ or merely ‘implied’ remains, up until to date, a matter contingent upon the precise 
operationalization of these concepts and are thus subject to discretion exercised by the Court. 
The Court – in Opinion 1/94 - came to distinct conclusions in response to the question whether the 
two distinct annexes fell under Article 113 EC Treaty. Applying a crude ‘aims and content’ test to the 
AoA, the Court liberally held that 
“[t]he objective of the Agreement on Agriculture is to establish, on a worldwide basis, ‘a fair and 
market-oriented agricultural trading system’ (see the preamble to that Agreement). The fact that 
the commitments entered into under that Agreement require internal measures to be adopted on the 
basis of Article 43 of the Treaty does not prevent the international commitments themselves from 
being entered into pursuant to Article 113 alone.”
27
 
In its assessment of the TRIPs Agreement, however, the Court came to the opposite conclusion: 
“Admittedly, there is a connection between intellectual property and trade in goods. Intellectually 
property rights enable those holding them to prevent third parties from carrying out certain acts. 
(…) That is not enough to bring them within the scope of Article 113. Intellectual property rights 
do not relate specifically to international trade; they affect internal trade just as much as, if not 
more than international trade.”
28
 
The Court further argued that recognizing exclusive competence of the Community 
“to enter into agreements with non-member countries to harmonize the protection of intellectual 
property and, at the same time, to achieve harmonization at Community level, the Community 
institutions would be able to escape the internal constraints to which they are subject in relation to 
procedures and to rules as to voting.”
29
 
These excerpts from Opinion 1/94 are worth highlighting for two reasons. First, they serve to illustrate 
that the application of the ‘effects’ criterion employed to further elaborate the ‘aims and content’ test 
is not an automatism but provides the Court with ample space for manoeuvre. The application of 
narrowly understood ‘direct and immediate effects on international trade’ - a criterion only developed 
in subsequent case law - to the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture could well result in the conclusion that 
the core of measures required for implementation of the agreement exerts effects on EU internal trade 
at least as much as on international trade. In essence, the AoA is an international instrument that 
prescribes limits for subsidies linked to domestic production, prices, and exporters. Measures 
implementing EU production subsidy commitments under the AoA - if compared to the reduction of a 
customs duty or even prohibition of production and circulation of counterfeited goods – exert indirect 
effects on international trade or only affect international trade by implication. EU subsidy 
commitments in line with EU obligations under Article 3, 6, and 7 of the AoA only decrease 
distortions of international trade indirectly by reducing the artificial incentives for domestic supply 
and export of agricultural produce, rather than regulating external trade directly.
30
 
Yet, such a narrow reading of the AoA, in context of Article 207 TFEU (and then Article 113 EC 
Treaty), would be unwarranted given core objective pursued by the content of the agreement and its 
inevitable effects on international trade. The Court hence rightly concluded that the aim and content of 
the AoA relates specifically to international trade in goods. In its examination of the TRIPs agreement 
in Opinion 1/94, however, the Court appeared to be neither impressed nor convinced by the object and 
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purpose or the direct and immediate effects of TRIPs obligations on international trade and held that 
its conclusion is a matter subject to shared internal market competence of the Community. 
The Court’s finding in Opinion 1/94 with respect to the TRIPs agreement, secondly, is remarkable 
in that it would appear to undermine the integrity of the substantive scope of the CCP. Rendering CCP 
applicability – as the correct legal basis for the conclusion of external commercial treaties – contingent 
on whether internal measures necessary for the implementation of respective international 
commitments require stricter procedures than the act concluding the agreement under the CCP would 
hollow out the scope of the Union’s exclusive competence allocated for the purpose of external 
commercial treaty-making from within. It seems nonsensical to subject the material scope of Article 
207 TFEU – and measures falling thereunder – to a case-by-case assessment of the procedural 
requirements for internal legal acts necessary for implementation. 
It is commendable, for this very reason, that the Court in Daiichi Sankyo effectively reversed its 
findings in Opinion 1/94. In Daiichi Sankyo, the Court held that 
“[t]he primary objective of the TRIPs Agreement is to strengthen and harmonise the protection of 
intellectual property on a worldwide scale (…). As follows from its preamble, the TRIPs 
Agreement has the objective of reducing distortions of international trade by ensuring, in the 
territory of each member of the WTO, the effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights.”
31
 
As such, the Court found - almost two decades after its judgment in Opinion 1/94 - that the TRIPs 
agreement, in its entirety, falls under exclusive competence of EU Common Commercial Policy. It is 
certainly noteworthy that ‘commercial aspect of intellectual property rights’ were added to the terms 
of CCP Article 207(1) TFEU in the course of the Treaty of Lisbon reform. The Court’s reasoning in 
Daiichi Sankyo, however, suggests that it is the re-consideration of the aim and content of the TRIPs 
agreement, and the Court’s general approach to the delineation of the scope of the CCP, rather than the 
reform of the scope of Article 113 EC Treaty, which triggered the Court’s change of mind. 
Indeed, giving further way to the Court’s approach taken in Opinion 1/94 would have structurally 
crippled the scope and exercise of Article 207 TFEU and the effectiveness and credibility of EU 
external action in the area international trade. I will come back to this point at the beginning of Section 
III. It remains worth emphasizing, for the purpose of this subjection, that it is the Court’s precise 
analytical approach to, and its understanding of the ‘direct and immediate effects’ criterion – in 
addition to the interpretation of superficial objectives set out in preambular language of the agreement 
in question – that makes for a key determinant of the results of the Court’s competence enquiry in 
general, and in Opinion 2/15 specifically. 
b.) ‘Aim and content’ of ‘deep and comprehensive’ EU Trade and Investment Agreements 
This question is of particular relevance in regard of treaty contents that are associated with the ‘new 
generation’ of EU external trade agreements, such as obligations on investment liberalization and 
protection, competition policy, government procurement, as well as sustainable development (labour 
rights and environmental protection). In particular, it is worth watching whether the Court is willing to 
subsume EUSFTA obligations under Article 207 TFEU, which do not form part of the language of 
that provision but are nevertheless bound to affect international trade in a more or less ‘direct and 
immediate’ manner. 
If the answer is affirmative across the board, the correct legal basis for the conclusion of the 
agreement is Article 207 TFEU. Read in conjunction with Article 2(1) TFEU and Article 3(1)(e) 
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TFEU, the Union would thus be exclusively competent to conclude the agreement without 
participation of the member states.  
It is by now common knowledge that AG Sharpston deems EUSFTA provisions on transport 
services, certain aspects of intellectual property rights, portfolio investment, labour rights, and 
environmental protection obligations to fail the aims and content test with regard to CCP Article 207 
TFEU and attributes provisions and components of the agreement to the scope of TFEU provisions for 
which the Union and member states share external powers. 
Without prejudging the reasoning of the AG in response to specific issues, her submission 
underlines the fact that the question over the correct legal basis for the conclusion of an international 
agreement is highly relevant – and inseparable - from the analysis of the existence and nature of 
competence.
32
 
“In Opinion 1/08, the Court explained that the character, whether exclusive or not, of the European 
Union’s competence to conclude agreements and the legal basis which is to be used for that 
purpose are two closely linked questions. […] Establishing that the European Union has 
competence to act at all in a particular field (and thus identifying the legal basis for such action) is 
therefore a precondition to determining the allocation of competences between the European 
Union and the Member States, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 TFEU, as regards a specific 
external action” [emphasis added].”
33
 
It is in this context that the Court submitted written questions to the parties - prior to the proceeding’s 
hearing - requesting the parties’ opinion on the correct legal bases for the conclusion of the EUSFTA. 
Their diverse answers to this question shall be highlighted in the next subsection, which examines the 
Court’s jurisprudence with regard to the appropriate legal basis and the question of competence for 
‘multi-purpose’ legal acts.34 
3. ‘Predominant’ and ‘Incidental’ Purposes of EU External Agreements 
The ‘aims and content’ test of the Court is not only reflected in its efforts to delineate the ambit of 
measures that, by their aim and content, fall within the conceptual realm of Article 207 TFEU or, 
alternatively, other EU policies frameworks. The ‘aim and content’ attributed to a legal act are 
similarly decisive criteria for the determination of the correct legal basis – or bases – where that act is 
found to comprise of multiple components and purposes, including objectives other than the CCP. AG 
Sharpston’s analysis and the wealth of Court jurisprudence reflect the fact that such acts can 
conceivably require reference to more than one legal basis, which may or may not include those for 
which the Union has not acquired exclusive competence a priori or by implication. 
The notion of ‘multi-purpose’ legal acts is of relevance in cases that involve broader external 
agreements, which may carry multiple related or unrelated components and purposes and may not only 
advance external commercial objectives. The Court’s case law has addressed the issue of ‘multi-
purpose’ acts and the corresponding question over the appropriate legal basis for the conclusion of 
such agreements by seeking to identify the ‘predominant purpose’ of the agreement in question. 
According to this strand of jurisprudence, the mere fact that an act comprises of two or multiple 
distinct components and purposes does not justify reference to a legal basis other than – in the present 
case – Article 207 TFEU: 
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“If examination of a European Union measure reveals that it pursues a twofold purpose or that it 
has a twofold component and if one of those is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or 
component, whereas the other is merely incidental, the measure must be founded on a single legal 
basis, namely, that required by the main or predominant purpose or component. By way of 
exception, if it is established that the measure pursues several objectives, which are inseparably 
linked without one being secondary and indirect in relation to the other, the measure must be 
founded on the various corresponding legal bases.”[emphasis added].
35
 
It follows that it is not sufficient to merely identify multiple purposes and components and assign 
distinct legal bases on that ground. The determination of the correct legal basis for multi-purpose acts 
requires a second step, notably the analysis of the relationship between two or more identifiable 
components and purposes of the act concluding the international agreement. In order to determine 
whether the act requires reference to more than one legal basis, the identified components must be 
qualified as ‘predominant’, ‘incidental’, ‘secondary’, or ‘indirect’ in relation to each other. As such, 
the Court seems to ask for a qualification of distinct components in context of others. In other words: 
whether an identified objective, purpose, or component of a legal act requires reference to a distinct 
legal basis does not only depend on the face value attributed to that component in isolation from its 
legal context, but on its characteristics relative to the characteristics of other components and purposes 
of the agreement. 
Does a methodology exist, which offers objective factors suitable for the qualification of the 
relationship between different purposes and components of broader external agreements or EU acts in 
general? Do the AG and the Court employ ‘objective factors amenable to judicial review’ to that end? 
More generally, is the Court required to give a definitive answer to the legal basis question in Opinion 
2/15 or is the legal basis analysis only a practical necessity for the purposes of the competence 
enquiry? It is arguable that, as a matter of systemic coherence, the Court’s competence analysis and 
legal basis determination should coincide and apply the same objective factors amenable to judicial 
review. It appears desirable, at the very least, that the Court’s responses to either question should not 
generate inconsistencies among the two and therefore meet the same standards. This is even more so 
in light of the fact that the notion of ‘predominance’ and ‘incidentalism’ of treaty objectives and 
components – if applied liberally – carry the risk of judicial overreach, which is inherent in a 
contextual interpretation of treaty content in exercise of a competence analysis. An important question 
is hence what kind of characteristics of an identified component would qualify said component as 
predominant or secondary and incidental relative to others. 
A comparison of the quantity of provisions subsumed under distinct objectives associated with 
identified components could serve as a simplistic indicator of ‘predominance’. A more useful 
indication may be the answer to the question whether a component creates new obligations or merely 
replicates (or incorporates) obligations that have already been assumed by the parties in context of 
other international agreements. As such, the enquiry would be directed at whether the treaty content in 
question has the effect of changing the status quo of EU obligations or not. But even if it does do so in 
a rudimentary (or incidental?) fashion, it may still be questionable whether such content creates rights 
and obligations to adopt specific measures. If not, they could be considered as incidental and 
secondary. More broadly, the Court could compare the effects of the provisions of a non-CCP 
component on the purpose that it discernibly pursues, on the one hand, with the aims / effects ratio of 
the CCP component, on the other. A question related to the considerations above is whether the legal 
quality of provisions subsumed under identified components (e.g. hard law vs. soft law; procedural vs. 
material obligations) factor into an analysis of whether a component is considered secondary and 
incidental. Distinct degrees of ‘bindingness’ and formal enforceability of provisions could serve as 
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indicators for ‘predominance’ enquiries. A distinction could also be made in regard of whether the 
provisions in question establish obligations for the EU treaty partner only, or for all parties likewise.
36
 
These considerations suggest that the Court’s methodological approach and respective choice of 
factors to determine the answer to the question of ‘predominance’ have implications for the overall 
answer to the question of competence. More specifically, the discretion exercised by the Court in 
choosing ‘objective factors’ for the determination of ‘predominant’ or ‘secondary’ and ‘incidental’ 
components could alter the answer to the question of competence in any given legal context. If the 
Court identifies components and purposes other than external commerce, but considers these to be 
incidental (and secondary) in relation to the CCP, those components would still fall under Article 207 
TFEU and hence exclusive treaty-making competence of the Union even if they do not satisfy the 
‘aims and content’ test for Article 207 TFEU in the first place. Finding that an act pursues more than 
one objective and purpose and comprises of more than one component implies that at least one 
component has failed the aim and content test with respect to the CCP. This objective, purpose, or 
component is then, notwithstanding the outcome of the ‘predominance’ analysis, liable to being 
categorized as secondary and incidental to the CCP component. 
That being said, and as mentioned above, permissive criteria for predominance testing are bound to 
generate considerable tension with the principle of conferral enshrined in Article 5 TEU. An 
excessively strict methodology, on the other hand, could jeopardize values of effective external treaty-
making by requiring reference to multiple legal bases for treaty components (or provisions) that would 
otherwise be treated as ‘incidental’ and thus implicate the necessity to invoke multiple legislative 
procedures, or involve the member states as independent parties to an EU external agreement. It 
remains the task of the Court to resolve this tension by devising ‘objective criteria amenable to judicial 
review’ that strike a balance between the need to protect the integrity of the principle of conferral, on 
the one hand, and the need to advance the predominant purposes of EU external economic governance, 
on the other. The next sub-section reviews the Court’s jurisprudence with regard to predominant and 
incidental treaty objectives, components, and provisions involving treaty content that relates to the 
CCP.  
a.) ‘Predominant’ and ‘Incidental’ Purposes, Components, and Provisions in CJEU Case Law  
Panos Koutrakos, in 2008, found that it is “apparent from the Court’s case law that [the choice of legal 
basis] may not be determined on the basis of specific and easily identifiable criteria”.37 If further 
confirmed, this circumstance is regrettable given the Court’s self-imposed requirements and the 
systemic value inherent to coherent judicial reasoning. More generally, it is worth questioning whether 
the Court applies the same standards and criteria in legal basis cases as in cases where it ought to 
determine correct legal bases for the purposes of competence analyses. 
To shed further light on this question, I examine existing evidence from the Court’s jurisprudence 
below, which illustrates the Court’s sentiments with respect to its choice of ‘objective factors’ for the 
determination of ‘predominance’ and ‘incidentalism’ of external treaty objectives and effects. We can, 
for this purpose, distinguish between cases, in which the Court was asked to determine whether the 
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object of the external agreement in question pursued commercial vs. non-commercial objectives, on 
the one hand, and cases where the parties litigated the competence and/or appropriate legal basis for 
the conclusion of purely commercial agreements. Moreover, we can distinguish between cases where 
the Court considered incidental treaty purposes and components versus cases, in which it considered 
incidental treaty provisions. I start with the category of non-commercial vs. commercial treaty 
purposes and close with an examination of the Court’s case law on ‘incidental’ provisions. 
In the Energy Star Agreement case, the key criterion for the Court’s predominance analysis was its 
observation that the agreement did not establish new obligations pursuing environmental objectives 
whereas its effects were considered to be direct in relation to trade. The Commission and the Council 
litigated both competence and the appropriate legal basis for the decision concluding an agreement 
with the United States based on Article 175(1) EC Treaty (environmental policy), which is subject to 
shared external competence.
38
 The Commission argued in favour of the annulment of that decision. In 
view of the Commission, the decision’s correct legal basis was (then) CCP Article 133 EC Treaty and 
thus subject to exclusive external competence. Following its analysis of the agreement, the Court 
observed that “the Energy Star Agreement simultaneously pursues a commercial-policy objective and 
an environmental-protection objective.”39 In this predominance analysis, the Court considered that the 
treaty was indeed “devised in order to stimulate the supply of, and demand for, energy-efficient 
products and therefore to promote energy conservation, and second, that its extension to the 
Community undoubtedly helps to achieve that objective”.40 Nevertheless, the Court deemed decisive 
the fact that “the Energy Star Agreement itself does not contain new energy-efficiency requirements” 
[emphasis added], whereas it found that “the effect on trade in office equipment […] is direct and 
immediate.”41 In line with this assessment, the Court held that the “commercial-policy objective 
pursued by the Energy Star Agreement must therefore be regarded as predominant, so that the decision 
approving the agreement should have been based on Article 133 EC”.42  
In Opinion 2/00, conversely, the Court held that the specific nature of obligations aimed at 
environmental protection established the predominant purpose of the Cartagena Protocol, whereas the 
mere fact that the very same obligations also exerted effects on trade was to be regarded as incidental. 
The task of the Court in this proceeding was to determine “whether the Protocol, in the light of its 
context, its aim and its content, constitutes an agreement principally concerning environmental 
protection which is liable to have incidental effects on trade in [living modified organisms] or whether, 
conversely, it is principally an agreement concerning international trade policy which incidentally 
takes account of certain environmental requirements, or whether it is inextricably concerned both with 
environmental protection and with international trade.”43 While the Commission's proposal for the 
Council decision was based on CCP Article 133 EC Treaty and (environment policy) Article 174(4) 
EC Treaty, the Council unanimously adopted the decision on the basis of Article 175(1) EC Treaty 
alone. The Court, this time, agreed with the Council in that it considered the essential purpose of the 
agreement – in light of its aim and content – to concern environmental protection, whereas its effects 
on trade were found to be only incidental. In view of the Court, “[t]he Commission's interpretation, if 
accepted, would effectively render the specific provisions of the [EC] Treaty concerning 
environmental protection policy largely nugatory, since, as soon as it was established that Community 
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action was liable to have repercussions on trade, the envisaged agreement would have to be placed in 
the category of agreements which fall within commercial policy.”44 
As discussed in the previous section, the Court’s judgment in the Daiichi Sankyo case reflects a 
significant re-consideration of the aim and content of the TRIPs agreement - in light of its ‘direct and 
immediate effects’ -, which the Court now found – in contrast to Opinion 1/94 - to predominantly 
advance the purposes of international trade rather than the harmonisation of intellectual property rights 
legislation for the internal market. Having established that the CCP makes for the predominant 
purpose of the TRIPs agreement, the Court found itself at ease with the notion that 
“[a]dmittedly, it remains altogether open to the European Union (…) to legislate on the subject of 
intellectual property rights by virtue of [shared] competence relating to the field of the internal 
market. However, acts adopted on that basis and intended to have validity specifically for the 
European Union will have to comply with the rules concerning the availability, scope and use of 
intellectual property rights in the TRIPs Agreement, as those rules are still, as previously, intended 
to standardise certain rules on the subject at world level and thereby to facilitate international 
trade.”
45
 
With this important finding, the Court appears to do nothing less than to disconnect the ambit of the 
CCP from the scope as well as nature of internal competences and the (potentially stricter) procedural 
requirements for the implementation of the Union’s international obligations. For the purposes of this 
subsection, however, it relevant to note that the Court, in this case, gives further way to the notion of a 
‘predominant purpose’ of an agreement where that agreement clearly exerts effects on internal market 
harmonisation and international trade regulation. 
In the Conditional Access Convention case, moreover, the Court found that certain provisions of 
the Convention, which prescribe confiscation measures, “are also supposed to improve the conditions 
for the functioning of the internal market. However, […] that objective is purely incidental to the 
primary objective of the contested decision” [emphasis added].46 The Court hence agreed with the 
legal view of Advocate General Kokott in that certain confiscation measures included in the 
Convention, if examined “in isolation, (…) may indeed be classified under the policy area of judicial 
cooperation in civil and criminal matters.”47 Yet, the AG placed considerable emphasis on the context 
of those rules by arguing that “the confiscation measures and the related international cooperation here 
are not the primary object of the Convention. Because the focus of the Convention is in the area of 
commercial policy, the signing of the Convention as a whole must be based solely on Article 207 
TFEU.”48 
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provisions of relevant international instruments on international co-operation in criminal or administrative matters and 
with their domestic law, the widest measure of co-operation in investigations and judicial proceedings relating to criminal 
or administrative offences established in accordance with this Convention.” 
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The Court has also showed itself amenable to a consideration of both incidental and ancillary 
(‘accessory’; ‘adjunct’) provisions that may, in its view, not be capable of affecting the allocation of 
competences and do not require reference to a distinct legal basis.
49
 
In Opinion 1/08, in the negative, the Court held that “the provisions of the agreements at issue relating 
to trade in transport services cannot be held to constitute a necessary adjunct to ensure the 
effectiveness of the provisions of those agreements concerning other service sectors […] or to be 
extremely limited in scope” [emphasis added].50 The Court based its finding on the consideration of 
both the quantity of provisions and their effect in modifying the parties obligations compared to the 
status quo. Considering the scope of the provisions under scrutiny, the Court observed that the 
“agreements at issue include, in this instance, a relatively high number of provisions whose effect is to 
modify both horizontal and sectoral commitments made by the Community and its Member States 
under the GATS, as regards the terms, conditions and limitations on which the Member States grant (i) 
access to transport services markets, in particular air or maritime, to suppliers of services from other 
WTO members and (ii) national treatment” [emphasis added].51 The Court consequently found that 
those provisions could neither be considered ancillary nor incidental to the Common Commercial 
Policy component. 
In Opinion 1/94 and Portugal vs. Council, conversely, the Court found that “the Community is 
entitled to include in external agreements otherwise falling within the ambit of [CCP] Article 113 
ancillary provisions for the organization of purely consultative procedures or clauses calling on the 
other party to raise the level of protection of intellectual property rights” [emphasis added].52 In 
Opinion 1/94, the Court had deemed a provision as ‘extremely limited in scope’, which obliged third 
treaty parties to improve domestic IPR standards to the extent that ‘a level of protection similar to that 
provided in the Community’ was achieved.53 The Court’s finding stands in contrast to the fact that the 
Community – according to the Court’s findings in Opinion 1/94 – was not exclusively competent to 
conclude an international agreement of the type and scope of the WTO TRIPs Agreement at the time. 
The said provision, in view of the Court, however, did neither affect the allocation of competence or 
deserved reference to a legal basis other than (CCP) Article 113 EC Treaty.
54
 
To broadly summarize the findings of the above examination of the Court’s case law: The Court 
has, in its consideration of incidental treaty components and provisions in past jurisprudence, 
considered factors such as objectives set out in the preamble; the quantity of potentially ‘incidental’ 
provisions in relation to the main component; the effects of provisions on the modification of the 
status quo of EU obligations; legal quality (prescriptive vs. aspirational provisions) and enforceability; 
as well as EU extra-territoriality of obligations. In one case reviewed here, the Court held that hard 
legal and enforceable treaty provisions make for a distinct treaty component, which is, however, 
incidental and secondary to the main component. Most significantly, the Court has, in some instances, 
deemed treaty purposes, components, and provisions to be incidental, notwithstanding the distinct 
nature of competence that would be attributed to them if assessed in isolation from its legal context in 
the specific case. 
                                                     
49
 It appears, that the meaning of the term ‘ancillary’ used to be applied, in older judgements such as Portugal vs Council 
(C-268/94), to both ‘incidental’ provisions and provisions that are ‘accessory’ or ‘adjunct’, whereas the more recent case 
law, such as Opinion 1/08, clearly distinguishes between autonomous incidental provisions (as in ‘extremely limited in 
scope’) and provisions that are considered to be adjunct, ancillary, or accessory to an identified main component. 
50
 Opinion 1/08 [ECR I-11129 2009]: para 166 
51
 idid.: para.168 
52
 Opinion 1/94: para. 68 ; Portugal vs Council (C-268/94): para 77 
53
 Opinion 1/94: para 67 
54
 Opinion 1/94: paras 67, 68 
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The Court, in other words, has showed itself ready to attribute legal bases to acts concluding an 
international agreement following a contextual interpretation of its aims and content - irrespective of 
the face-value purpose of ‘incidental’ treaty components and the associated nature of EU competence 
that would, if read in isolation, otherwise govern such content. At the very minimum, it seems clear 
that the mere coverage of a policy area by the content of an external agreement does not suffice to 
affect the Court’s conclusions on the appropriate legal basis for the conclusion of that agreement and 
the existence and nature of EU competences. The findings demonstrate that the Court has taken the 
notions of predominance and incidentalism for the determination of the appropriate legal basis of an 
act concluding an external agreement seriously. It remains questionable, however, whether the factors 
that the Court considered on a case-by-case basis can serve as credible guidance for future judgments. 
This is particular so with regard to the highly politicized judgment in Opinion 2/15 where the legal 
context – and thus the scope of analysis - extends to a uniquely large amount of specific legal 
obligations of heterogeneous character. 
These considerations suggest, in any case, that the Court retains ample space for discretionary 
decision-making, precisely by having – deliberately or not - avoided the design of a clear 
methodology, which sets out ‘objective factors amenable to judicial review’ for the determination of 
the appropriate legal bases for acts concluding agreements that comprise of multiple components and 
pursue more than one objective. This finding holds true for both legal basis cases and competence 
enquiries, which require the determination of legal bases. 
The legal view of Advocate General Sharpston has set a strict benchmark for a possible contextual 
attribution of legal bases for the conclusion of the EUSFTA. Very much in contrast to AG Kokott in 
the Conditional Access Convention case, for instance, AG Sharpston advances a restrictive approach 
to a contextual examination of treaty aims and content. Irrespective of the proportion of the agreement 
under scrutiny, the AG attributes ‘constituent’ purposes and legal bases grounded on a mere face-value 
assessment of the most miniscule treaty components, which she evaluates in isolation from, rather than 
in context of each other. 
b.) ‘Predominance’ and ‘Incidentalism’ in View of Advocate General Sharpston 
In the preliminary considerations of her legal opinion, AG Sharpston appears to square the circle by 
recognizing the possibility of ‘predominant’ and ‘incidental’ treaty components, on the one hand, but 
limiting the realm of ‘secondary’ or ‘incidental’ treaty purposes ex ante to components that are 
‘extremely limited in scope’. 
 “In identifying the legal basis, it follows from well-settled case-law that, where an agreement of 
the European Union pursues more than one purpose or comprises two or more components of 
which one is identifiable as the main or predominant purpose or component, whereas the other(s) 
is (or are) merely incidental or extremely limited in scope, the European Union has to conclude 
that agreement based on a single legal basis, namely that required by the main or predominant 
purpose or component. Thus, if the predominant purpose of the EUSFTA is that of pursuing the 
common commercial policy and other aspects of it are properly to be regarded either as 
constituting a necessary adjunct to that main component or as being extremely limited in scope, 
the substantive legal basis for concluding that agreement would be Article 207(1) TFEU. It would 
then follow from Article 3(1)(e) TFEU that the European Union has exclusive competence to 
conclude the EUSFTA.”
55
 
It is true that AG Sharpston applies the semantics of this standard throughout her legal opinion. In 
practice, however, the AG does not test predominance or ‘incidentalism’ of identified components in 
context of each other but is strictly guided by a face-value analysis of the content of the EUSFTA. 
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In the AG’s submission in Opinion 2/15, the notion of ‘incidental’ or ‘secondary’ components and 
purposes – understood as relational concepts – appears to fall victim to her readiness to make 
reference to different legal bases wherever aims and content of the provisions of the EUSFTA can be 
distinguished from the CCP and discernibly attributed to the scope of other competence conferring EU 
treaty provisions. This preliminary observation raises the question what it would take, in view of the 
AG (and the Court), to qualify an identified component of an external economic agreement as 
‘incidental’ in relation to other treaty components. For AG Sharpston – as further demonstrated in the 
next section – this analytical category does not to exist. 
Analytically, the AG proceeds as follows: In a first step, the AG identifies the content of the 
EUSFTA that falls within the scope of the CCP; qualifies an array of provisions as accessory, ancillary 
and adjunct to the CCP aims and content if they are deemed to support the effectiveness of substantive 
provisions falling under Article 207(1) TFEU; and identifies components that otherwise fall under 
exclusive competence of the EU via other legal bases associated with a priori exclusive competences 
under Article 3(1) TFEU or as an implied treaty-making power via Article 3(2) TFEU.
56
 
In a second step, the AG identifies distinct EUSFTA components that, in her view, fall outside of 
the scope of the CCP and do not otherwise fall under exclusive EU competence.
57
 Moreover, the AG 
determines the realm of provisions that she finds to make for a necessary adjunct or to be accessory to 
the substantive provisions of those components. The AG proceeds by proposing suitable legal bases, 
according to the presumed aims and content of those components, for which the Union and the 
member states share competence. In one instance, as further discussed in the next section, the AG 
finds that EU member states are exclusively competent to enter into the obligation under scrutiny. 
Restricted by the analytical focus on the nature of external competences, the AG determines that 
“none of those parts can be identified as either the main or predominant component of the EUSFTA or 
as being ‘merely incidental’ or ‘extremely limited in scope.”58 
In a third step, the AG identifies a very limited number of incidental provisions, which, in her view, 
do not pass the threshold for being characterized as distinct components or purposes of the agreement 
and are “autonomous in relation to other provisions of the EUSFTA” yet ‘extremely’ or ‘very limited 
in scope’.59 Other provisions are regarded to be ‘accessory’ to the agreement as a whole where they 
exempt certain regulatory areas from the application of the EUSFTA.
60
 
As mentioned above, the AG de facto does not consider the possibility of incidental components of 
the EUSFTA once she has determined that a component in question does not fall within the scope of a 
Union policy, which is subject to EU exclusive competence. It is at this juncture that the legal basis 
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 Certain transport services (by implication) and the conservation of marine biological resources under the common 
fisheries policy (a priori). (see para 570) 
57
 Certain transport services; portfolio investment; moral intellectual property rights; and labour and environmental 
standards. (see para 570) 
58
 Opinion of AG Sharpston: para 550 
59
 Opinion of AG Sharpston: paras 552, 553. “Finally, Articles 17.7 (current account and capital movements) and 17.8 
(sovereign wealth funds) contain rules which are autonomous in relation to the other provisions of the EUSFTA. 
However, those provisions are very limited in scope and therefore cannot be regarded as a distinct component of the 
EUSFTA. I therefore conclude that (…) for those reasons, they are not capable of altering the allocation of competences 
between the European Union and the Member State as regards the various components of the EUSFTA” Among these 
otherwise aspirational clauses, Article 17.7 EUSFTA prescribes, in hard legal language, that “[t]he Parties shall authorise, 
in freely convertible currency and in accordance with the provisions of Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, any payments and transfers on the current account of the balance-of-payments between the 
Parties.” 
60
 Clauses exempting taxation and balance of payments, for instance, are regarded as accessory to the agreement in that they 
preserve competences of the parties (see para 550 of the Opinion of the AG). 
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test for predominance and incidentalism – as restrictively applied by the AG - finds practical and - in 
her view - constitutional limits in the quest for an answer to the Commission’s enquiry over the 
existence and nature of competence for the conclusion of the EUSFTA. 
c.) Revisiting ‘Gravity’ - The Predominant Purpose and Incidental Components of the EUSFTA 
The AG and the Court eventually have to determine the primary law provisions under which EUSFTA 
content can be concluded in order to determine the existence and nature of EU competences. It is 
debatable, however, whether the AG and the Court are required to provide a definitive answer to the 
question over the appropriate legal basis (or bases) for the adoption of the act concluding the 
EUSFTA. The Court may treat the legal basis determination as solely relevant for the purposes of 
competence analysis. The more important question is whether the Court applies the same analytical 
standards in legal basis cases when compared to competence cases that necessarily require the 
determination of legal bases. 
The parties, in the proceedings, have provided widely diverging answers to the Court’s question 
over the appropriate legal basis. This circumstance reflects diverging political predispositions, which 
are mirrored in respective legal arguments. Disagreement among the member states, however, also 
surfaces the lack of clarity about the (existence of a) difference between the determination of legal 
basis for the purposes of competence analysis, on the one hand, and the question over the appropriate 
legal basis for the formal adoption of the act concluding an international agreement. 
In response to the Court’s enquiry, in the oral phase of the proceeding, the Commission cited 
Articles 207, 63, 91, 100(2), 216 (1) TFEU as the correct legal bases for the conclusion of the 
EUSFTA.
61
 There was no disagreement between the parties over the fact that the CCP and transport 
policy (Articles 207, 91, 100(2) TFEU) constituted correct legal bases of the EUSFTA conclusion. In 
addition, however, the Council referred to Articles 43(2), 153, and 192 TFEU as necessary legal bases 
to cover EUSFTA obligations on agriculture, as well as labour and environmental protection. While 
some member states wished to add further legal bases, others promoted a more restrictive approach. 
Germany, France, and Finland expressed the opinion that Articles 207, 91, and 100(2) TFEU sufficed. 
These parties, however, placed great emphasis on their view that the choice of legal bases for the act 
concluding the EUSFTA does not need to reflect the vertical division of competences between the 
Union and the member states. 
The projection of this apparent state of confusion over the relationship between the analysis of the 
conferral of competence and the attribution of the appropriate legal basis could provide for emphasis 
to the conclusions drawn by Panos Koutrakos: “In the multilayered system of EU external relations, it 
is necessary that the notion of the balance of competence should become central in the choice of the 
appropriate legal basis and the delimitation of competence. Attention should be paid to drawing the 
outer limits of not only the CCP but also the other external relations legal bases in a way which would 
ensure that the conditions for their application do not become irrelevant.”62  
Drawing the outer limits of the CCP, to be sure, requires a robust operationalization of the 
conceptual link between treaty content, the specific measures that its obligations set forth, and the 
quality of their effects on international trade. The Opinion 2/15 proceeding offers a unique yet 
challenging opportunity for the Court to enhance clarity on this matter. The same applies to the aims 
and content of obligations that pursue EU treaty objectives that are distinct from, but stand in context 
of the CCP. Attributing multiple legal bases to a Union act on the grounds of treaty content that is de 
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 The Commission used the opportunity to emphasize its view that transport services covered by Article 91 TFEU fall 
under implied exclusive Union competence. 
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 Koutrakos, Panos (2008): Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU External Relations. op. cit. p198 
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facto ineffective in achieving the aims it superficially pursues (and exerts no direct and immediate 
effects to those ends) would result in a distorted image of the nature of external competence for the 
adoption of the respective legal act. It is for this reason that multiple identified treaty components and 
purposes should be assessed and weighed in context of and in relation to each other, based on 
objective factors, rather than in clinical isolation. If however, the Court’s analysis omits a rigorous 
predominance test and is, rather, purely grounded on a face value assessment of competences for the 
conclusion of external treaty content (and attributes legal bases respectively) this choice should be 
made in a clear and transparent manner.  
The following two paragraphs set out an alternative working hypothesis for the purpose of 
analyzing AG Sharpston’s and – eventually - the Court’s opinion. This hypothesis proposes a 
contextual and effects-based interpretation of the aim and content of the EUSFTA in light of EU 
primary law. The Court’s jurisprudence, as shown above, prescribes a contextual reading of the aims 
and content of the EUSFTA in order to determine the ‘centre of gravity’ of the act concluding the 
agreement. Such a contextual interpretation should take account of the discernable main objective, 
distinct components, and their effects on the purposes they pursue. 
This analysis, in application of the criteria considered by the Court as outlined above, could result 
in the conclusion that the primary objective and the direct and immediate effects of EUSFTA 
obligations extend to the promotion of international commerce by and between the European Union 
and Singapore. It is clear, however, that there is no single legal basis in EU law, which governs the 
Union’s external economic relations. The EUSFTA, in particular, contains three distinct components 
to that end, notably a CCP component, a transport services component, and one component that 
governs investment other than foreign direct investment (portfolio). 
Drawing a distinction between the commercial objectives of the EUSFTA and potentially residual 
non-commercial elements is not to suggest that the EU is exclusively competent to conclude the 
components that advance the EUSFTA’s predominant commercial purpose. To the contrary, EU 
competence for the EUSFTA’s predominant objective and the distinct components that exert effects to 
that end are divided in EU exclusive competence for the CCP, shared external competence for certain 
transport services, and member states’ exclusive competence for the termination of member states 
bilateral investment treaties. Whether or not provisions governing portfolio investment liberalization 
and protection fall within the scope of EU exclusive competence or shared competence, finally, 
depends on whether or not the Court is willing to consider Article 63(1) TFEU as a ‘common rule’ 
within the meaning of the third ground of Article 3(2) – an issue that will be raised briefly in the next 
subsection before entering into an examination and discussion of AG Sharpston’s analysis and 
findings. 
The EUSFTA’s non-commercial treaty objectives and components (‘moral rights’; labour and 
environmental protection) may be deemed purely incidental to the main purpose of the agreement and 
very limited in scope - if properly assessed in context of treaty components governing commerce 
between the EU and Singapore. Testing for incidentalism of identified non-commercial components of 
the EUSFTA requires analysis that is based on objective factors. The Court, in its jurisprudence, has 
not set out such factors in a comprehensive or general manner. Rather, such analysis ought to be 
guided by the factors the Court has considered on a case-by-case basis in its past jurisprudence, which 
I have examined above. I shall discuss the question of incidentalism of non-commercial provisions and 
components of the EUSFTA in context of the analysis of AG Sharpston’s opinion in Section III. 
4. Implied Powers under Article 3(2) TFEU 
Finally, in addition to and distinction from a priori exclusivity of external competence under Article 
3(1) TFEU, the Union may have acquired exclusive external competence for the conclusion of 
international agreements by implication via Article 3(2) TFEU when  
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1)  “its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union” 
2) “or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence,”  
3) “or in so far as its conclusion [by the member states independently] may affect common rules or 
alter their scope” [emphasis added] 
Beyond the apparent clarity of the first ground set out by Article 3(2) TFEU
63
, the second ground of 
the provision prescribes EU exclusive competence, according to the Court, where the “attainment of 
the Community objective [is] inextricably linked to the conclusion of the international agreement.”64  
The third ground of Article 3(2), moreover, makes for a significant codification of the Court’s 
ERTA case law
65
 and prescribes EU exclusivity when “the scope of EU rules may be affected or 
altered by international [member state] commitments where such commitments are concerned with an 
area which is already covered to a large extent by such rules”[emphasis added].66 It suffices to say, at 
this point, that both the ERTA jurisprudence and its codification in Article 3(2) TFEU through the 
Treaty of Lisbon amendments have become a frequently used vehicle to advance exclusivity of 
external competence in regulatory areas where the Union has already exercised – or is in the process 
of exercising - its shared internal competence to an equivalent degree. In her submission to the Court, 
AG Sharpston advances a thorough analysis of the status quo of EU secondary legislation in areas 
where the Commission has alleged the existence of ‘ERTA-effects’. A comprehensive examination of 
AG Sharpston’s precise method for identifying implied exclusivity on the basis of existing secondary 
legislation, however, goes beyond the scope of this paper. Suffices to note, in any case, that the 
Opinion 2/15 proceeding provides a unique opportunity for the Court to assess the effect – at this very 
moment in time - of constantly evolving EU secondary legislation on the state of implied EU exclusive 
external competence. 
This note focuses on another question relating to implied exclusivity of external competence. The 
Commission, in the proceedings, advanced a novel argument with respect to the third ground of 
Article 3(2) TFEU. In view of the Commission, exclusive external competence based on the Article 
3(2), third ground, does not, in the specific case of EU internal competence for the movement of 
capital, require the exercise of internal competence (i.e. exercise of internal shared competence and – 
thus - existence of secondary legislation) but can be triggered by the mere existence of the ‘common 
rule’ codified Article 63(1) TFEU. In other words, the Commission argues that implied exclusive 
external competence for portfolio investment is established by reference to a primary law provision, 
without necessitating the exercise of the Union’s (allegedly existent) internal competence. The 
question that inevitably arises is the following: Can EU primary law, in this specific case, trigger an 
‘ERTA-effect’? I will come back to a discussion of this issue in the final part of the next section. 
III. The Legal Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston 
In AG Sharpston’s words, the questions addressed to the Court in the Opinion 2/15 proceeding are 
about “the core constitutional issue of the division of power between the European Union and its 
constituent member states – the principle of conferral of powers. It is about striking the desired 
balance between the unifying (supra-national) central authority set up under the Treaties and the 
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 This trigger, in view of Krajewski (2012, op. cit.) finds its origin in Opinion 1/94: para 94  
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 Opinion 1/03 [ECR I-01145 2006], para 37. Opinion 1/94. para 86 
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 Commission vs Council (C-22-70 ERTA) para 22 
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European Union’s constituent, still sovereign, Member States. Who is competent to act within the 
territory of the European Union: the EU or the Member States?”67  
1. Exclusive Member States’ Competences 
In the written and oral submissions to the Court, the Council and several member states had claimed 
that ‘mixity is a must’. To that end, member states and Council argued that various provisions of the 
EUSFTA fall under exclusive member states’ competence.68 These include the agreement’s rules on 
the expropriation of foreign direct and portfolio investment; the liberalization of portfolio 
investment
69
; diplomatic protection of investors in arbitration proceedings
70
; moral rights related to 
intellectual property protection
71
; certain provisions relating to environmental protection
72
; as well as 
one individual rule governing the termination of member states’ bilateral investment treaties (BITs) 
with Singapore.
73
 
AG Sharpston dismisses all of these ‘attempts of mixity’ – except one. The AG opines that “the 
European Union has no competence to agree to Article 9.10(1) of the EUSFTA”, which provides that 
existing EU Member States’ bilateral investment treaties with Singapore “cease to have effect and 
shall be replaced and superseded” by the EUSFTA. The EU cannot agree to an obligation that requires 
the termination of international agreements of its member states if these are not parties to the 
agreement containing the said obligation. Doing so would violate “the fundamental rule of consent in 
international law-making”.74 As for this single provision of the EUSFTA, in consequence, “mixity is a 
must”.  
However, there does not seem to be a good enough reason why EU trade and investment 
agreements ought to include a BIT termination clause in the first place. The assumption that underlies 
its inclusion in the EUSFTA is to treat the termination of member states’ BITs as a collary of entering 
into obligations providing for a regime that succeeds member states BITs. EU secondary legislation, 
however, already requires that member states’ BITs may only maintain in force “until a bilateral 
agreement between the Union and the same third country enters into force”.75 A reference to this rule 
in EU trade and investment agreements may suffice to assure a third country of the EU member state 
obligation that follows from the entry into force of the EUSFTA under EU law. The termination clause 
of Article 9.10(1) EUSFTA is arguably redundant with respect to future EU treaties with third parties. 
The Union institutions could, in practice, rely on the duty of sincere cooperation, which requires that 
the member states “shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of 
the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.”76  
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 For a legal opinion requested by the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, arguing along these lines, see: 
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As a result, EU exclusive member states competence identified by the AG in this particular 
instance, by itself, does not make for an unmovable obstacle to the signing and conclusion of ‘EU-
only’ agreements in the future. 
2. The Scope of EU Exclusive External Competence for the Common Commercial Policy under 
Article 207 TFEU 
a.) The Nature of EU External versus Internal Competence for Market Integration 
The European Union enjoys exclusive competence over Common Commercial Policy (CCP), which is 
governed by the provisions of Article 207 TFEU.
77
 Some member states, however, claimed in their 
written submissions that Article 207(6) TFEU
78
 renders the exclusivity of EU competence in the area 
of the CCP contingent upon the existence of parallel – or corresponding - exclusive internal 
competence for the same substantive policy areas.
79
 The Advocate General, however, dismisses this 
notion, which would indeed significantly limit the exercise of exclusive CCP powers: the scope of EU 
exclusive competence for external commercial treaty-making, she finds, is separate and broader than 
internal EU exclusive competence for market integration. EU competence for internal market 
integration, notably, is shared between the EU and the member states.
80
 Article 207(6) TFEU should, 
moreover, not be read to require the exercise of internal shared competence as a precondition for the 
exercise of external exclusive competence. Rather, the AG deems Article 207(6) TFEU to make for a 
twofold expression of the principle of conferral, which is set out in Article 2(1) and 2(2) TFEU. 
Article 207(6) TFEU is therefore redundant. As a result, the member states’ claim of perfect 
parallelism between internal and external exclusivity of competence does not find the AG’s support 
and leaves the integrity of EU competence for the CCP intact.
81
 The AG thereby follows the important 
conclusions of the Court in Daichii Sankyo, which made for a significant and commendable departure 
from the Court’s original position, as expressed in Opinion 1/94. I have provided a more detailed 
discussion of this issue in Section II(2)(i) above.
82
 
b.) The Common Commercial Policy Component of the EUSFTA 
AG Sharpston’s thorough response to the questions put before the Court generally and unsurprisingly 
confirms the expansion of the material scope of EU exclusive external competence in the area of its 
Common Commercial Policy under Article 207(1) TFEU.
83
 The entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in 2009 has considerably widened the scope of the said provision by removing the distinction 
between trade in goods and services. Moreover, the treaty added ‘foreign direct investment’ to the 
realm of the Common Commercial Policy set out in Article 207(1) TFEU. 
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 Article 2(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 2(1) TFEU and Article 3(1)(e) TFEU 
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In Daiichi Sankyo, on the basis of pre-Lisbon case law, the Court applied the aims and content test 
to identify measures that fall within the scope of Article 207(1) TFEU. As discussed in the previous 
section, the Court subsumes content of EU legal acts under Article 207(1) TFEU if they ‘specifically 
relate to international trade in that they are essentially intended to promote, facilitate or govern trade 
and have direct and immediate effects on trade’.84 The AG opines that this standard applies to 
EUSFTA rules and commitments on trade in goods and services indiscriminately, as well as to foreign 
direct investment
85
 and commercial aspects of intellectual property rights
86
. Moreover, AG Sharpston 
finds that EUSFTA commitments on public procurement
87
, competition policy
88
, the mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications
89
, and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in 
renewable energy generation
90
 are all ‘specifically related’ to international trade or FDI by means of 
governance, promotion, or exerting direct effects. 
Notwithstanding fierce political and public debates over investment protection standards, it is 
unsurprising that Article 207(1) TFEU covers, in AG Sharpston’s view, both market access 
liberalisation and standards applying to the protection of foreign investors and their investments ex 
post-admission. Her opinion confirms an inferential reading of the term ‘abolition of restrictions’ in 
Article 206(1) so as to encompass both ‘restrictions’ and standards of protection likewise.91 With 
reference to the Court’s jurisprudence on this question92, the AG dismisses member states’ claims for 
an exclusive or shared external power to regulate property and its expropriation, which they based on 
Article 345 TFEU. 
Both liberalization and treatment of FDI consequently fall within the ambit of EU exclusive 
competence.
93
 The dispute settlement mechanisms enforcing liberalization commitments and 
protection standards, moreover, “are accessory to the allocation of substantive competences” – 
including the politically contentious Investor-to-State-Dispute-Settlement (ISDS) mechanism of the 
EUSFTA.
94
 
To establish that the provisions in question do in fact exert direct effects on international trade, the 
AG does not review available empirical evidence of such effects but is satisfied by examining whether 
a notional link can be established between the content of the EUSFTA and its potential to exert 
‘immediate and direct effects on international trade’. In context of her examination of chapter 12 on 
competition policy, for instance, the AG observes that 
“[the EUSFTA] requires each party to maintain and enforce in its respective territories 
comprehensive legislation governing agreements between undertakings, abuses of a dominant 
position and concentrations between undertakings which result in a substantial lessening of 
competition or which significantly impede competition, provided they affect trade between the 
European Union and Singapore. Those types of anti-competitive conduct are considered to be 
liable to undermine the benefits of trade liberalisation which the EUSFTA aims to achieve, either 
by rendering rules on market access nugatory or by reducing the economic benefits which 
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undertakings of one Party may hope to obtain by trading their goods or services in the territory of 
the other Party.”
95
 
Such reasoning is as intuitively persuasive, as it is permissive and discretionary. It reveals, in this 
instance, that the AG is, in her analysis, not guided by a rigorous examination of the ‘direct and 
immediate effects on international trade’ criterion. It is sufficient for the AG that the content “[aims] at 
promoting, facilitating or governing trade and thus has direct and immediate effects on trade in goods 
and services.” The ‘aims and effects’ test applied in Daichii Sankyo and previous cases, however, 
seems to require that both conditions - aims and direct effects – are satisfied. It appears, however, that 
AG Sharpston’s threshold is more generous in that direct effects are assumed to logically follow from 
codified intentions and objectives. The AG, in this instance, does consider the context of EUSFTA 
rules on competition matters – which is the liberalization of international trade – identifies the parties’ 
intention to exert direct and immediate effects on international trade through rules and cooperation on 
competition policy matters. This circumstance is noteworthy to the extent that the AG’s application of 
the ‘aims and content’ test places considerably more emphasis on the analysis of treaty objectives than 
on treaty effects. While commendable on substance in this particular instance, it is questionable at 
least whether this methodological nuance is conducive to achieving a clearer and more definitive 
delimitation of the CCP and whether the Court will engage in a more elaborate operationalization of 
the ‘direct effects’ test. 
In sum, the overwhelming share of EUSFTA commitments, according to AG Sharpston’s view, 
falls within the realm of EU exclusive competence for Common Commercial Policy. These 
conclusions are significant because they would – if upheld – subject a wide range of contemporary EU 
external economic policies to exclusive EU competence. The scope of the CCP, in her view, goes far 
beyond the legal framework of the WTO and is much wider than the limited scope proposed by EU 
member states, the Council, and numerous legal scholars. 
The CCP content of the EUSFTA, in sum, makes for the by far largest component that aims at 
achieving the predominant objective of the EUSFTA, notably the promotion and governance of 
commerce between the EU and Singapore. 
The following sections discuss components of the agreement, which, according to AG Sharpston’s 
interpretation of the delineation of competences, would give member states represented in the Council 
the right to insist on ‘mixity’. 
3. The Transport Exception under Article 207(5) TFEU 
AG Sharpston’s reading of Article 207(5) TFEU (re)confirms the general exclusion of international 
agreements in the field of transport from EU Common Commercial Policy under Article 207 TFEU. 
“As regards international trade in transport services, the Treaties therefore seek to maintain a 
fundamental parallelism between internal competence and external competence.” Those parts of the 
EUSFTA that concern transport services and services ancillary to transport a priori fall under EU 
shared competence for transport under Article 4(2) (g) and Title VI of Part III of the TFEU.
96
 
The EU can only acquire implied exclusive competence in the field of transport if one of the three 
conditions of Article 3(2) TFEU is satisfied.
97
 The third – and most frequently employed - ground of 
Article 3(2) TFEU triggers implied exclusive competence if the content of an external treaty is largely 
covered by EU common rules by means of the exercise of EU internal shared competence. EU 
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common rules pre-empt the exercise of shared competences on behalf of the Member States.
98
 Once 
common rules are adopted in a specific area, only the EU is competent to act externally. External 
member state action in that specific area would otherwise risk affecting or altering the scope of 
internal rules.
99
 AG Sharpston thus confirms the established Court’s ERTA jurisprudence and its 
codification in Article 3(2) TFEU.
100
  
In light of corresponding EU secondary legislation, the AG finds that the Union has acquired 
implied exclusive competence on this basis over EUSFTA provisions on rail and road transport 
services. The Commission, in her view, failed to demonstrate, however, that the necessary conditions 
for conferral of implied exclusive competence in respect to air transport, maritime transport, and 
inland waterway transport services had been met.
101
 They remain subject to shared external 
competence under Article 4 (2)(g) TFEU in conjunction with Title VI of Part Three TFEU. The 
transport component of the EUSFTA is thus partly covered by exclusive external competence as well 
as shared competence. 
Following the logic of the transport exception of Article 207(5) TFEU, EU public procurement 
commitments in the field of transport services also fall outside the scope EU Common Commercial 
Policy and are thus subject to shared competence.
102
  
The Court is likely to follow AG Sharpston’s analysis of EUSFTA commitments on transport. In 
order to avoid ‘mixity’ in future EU trade and investment agreements, such treaties would have to 
exclude maritime, air, and inland waterway transport, as well as transport services commitments in the 
public procurement chapter.  
Splitting transport policy commitments by separating provisions falling under EU exclusive and 
shared competence respectively would likely change the balance of negotiated concessions among the 
parties to the agreement and thus affect negotiated content. Doing so, however, appears to be 
unproblematic in practice. The EU has indeed negotiated stand-alone – ‘mixed’ - transport agreements 
with third countries in the past.
103
 
Finally, the evolution of EU legislation in the area of air, maritime, and inland waterway transport 
services may, in the future, confer implied exclusive competence onto the EU and thus empower the 
Union to enter into external commitments in these areas by itself. 
4. (Non-)Commercial Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: ‘Moral Rights’ 
As noted above, the Advocate General agrees with the Commission that essentially all EUSFTA 
provisions on intellectual property rights and their protection fall within the scope of Article 207(1) 
TFEU and thus EU exclusive competence.
104
 In the opinion of the AG, however, EUSFTA provisions 
governing ‘moral rights’ of authors and performers are ‘non-commercial’ in their nature and thus 
cannot form part of the material scope of the protection of ‘commercial aspects of intellectual property 
rights’ under Article 207(1) TFEU. Rules on the protection of authors’ and performers’ moral rights 
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would thus not be covered by EU exclusive competence.
105
 Rather, in her view, non-commercial 
aspects of intellectual property rights “can be regarded as necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
internal market” and hence fall within shared competence of the European Union and the Member 
States on the basis of Articles 4(2)(a), 26(1), and 216(1), second ground, TFEU.
106
 
This view deserves further scrutiny. The discretion exercised by the Court in past judgments 
appears to allow for conclusions that would render the EUSFTA provisions in question subject to 
Article 207 TFEU - either on the basis of their effects on trade, or on the basis of their purely 
incidental character. The following elaborations briefly examine the provisions at stake and discuss the 
two lines of reasoning for their (direct or contextual) inclusion within the scope of Article 207 (1) 
TFEU. 
Chapter 11 of the EUSFTA on Intellectual Property sets out minimum standards for the protection 
of copyrights; patents; trademarks; designs; topographics; geographical indications; undisclosed 
information; and plant variety rights.
107
 The objective of the respective rules is to facilitate the 
production and commercialization of products and services and to increase the benefits from trade and 
investment through the adequate and effective level of protection of intellectual property rights and the 
provision of measures for the effective enforcement of such rights.
108
 To that end, Article 11.4 
EUSFTA also incorporates the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works as well as the WIPO 
Treaty on Performances and Phonograms. Article 6bis of the former and Article 5 of the latter 
agreement contain two largely identical provisions on the protection of ‘moral rights’ of authors and 
performers respectively - ‘independently of their economic rights’. In essence, the two provisions 
protect authors’ and performers’ rights to be identified with the work or performance in question after 
economic rights have been transferred, even post-mortem, and the right to object to distortions or 
modifications of that work or performance if these would be prejudicial to his/her reputation. As such, 
the identifiable aim of the provisions is to protect author and performer rights where their economic 
rights, which are protected under these very treaties, have ceased to be effective. 
The first consideration is whether such rights do – or have the potential to – exert direct and 
immediate effects on trade and therefore fall within the scope of Article 207(1) TFEU. While the 
rights protected here are inherently ‘independent of economic rights’, they do place a restriction on the 
exercise of commercial activities involving the use of the work or performance. It is the purpose of 
such rights to qualify the exercise of commercial property rights to the extent that those engaging in 
commercial activity involving the work or performance in question must respect certain rights of the 
author or performer. In this way, ‘moral rights’ – conceptually - exert a direct effect on trade and make 
for a significant ‘aspect’ or restriction of commercial intellectual property rights. This point may serve 
to illustrate the difficulty to distinguish between commercial and non-commercial aspects of 
intellectual property rights – and direct versus implied effects on trade - in practice. 
The provisions in question are, moreover, enforceable under the dispute settlement provisions of 
the EUSFTA. Remedies for the violation of a EUSFTA obligation include trade sanctions. It is in this 
(second) way that moral rights in the EUSFTA context are specifically related to international trade 
and have the potential to exert direct and immediate effects. This circumstance may make for a 
decisive difference if compared to the Court’s agreement with Advocate General Wahl’s view 
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expressed in the Opinion 3/15 proceeding where he states that “[a]n example of a non-trade-related 
aspect of intellectual property is that relating to moral rights.”109 
But even if the Court finds moral rights provisions to fall outside the scope of Article 207(1) TFEU 
the Court ought to consider whether the parties’ obligations concerning the protection of such rights 
make for an incidental and secondary objective and component of the EUSFTA Chapter 11 in relation 
to the EUSFTA’s predominant commercial objective; in context of the CCP component of the 
EUSFTA; and/or in context of EUSFTA chapter 11 on commercial aspects of intellectual property 
rights protection. A respective test could examine whether the EUSFTA obligations would have the 
effect of changing the parties’ obligations; if yes, whether the new status quo of obligations would 
require the EU to take specific measures; and whether such measures would have the effect of 
achieving an objective alternate to the external commercial objectives of the EUSFTA, such as the 
functioning of the internal market. 
The Berne Convention has been ratified by all EU member states.
110
 Accession to the EU requires 
accession to the Berne Convention.
111
 Compliance of national laws with the provisions of the 
Convention thus makes for an obligation under EU law. The WIPO Treaty, moreover, has been 
ratified by the EU and its member states.
112
 Singapore, moreover, is a party to both Conventions. 
The obligations on ‘moral rights’ accruing to authors and performers are harmonized by EU law - 
in case of the WIPO Treaty - and across member states, in case of the Berne Convention. Through the 
incorporation – or: replication - in the EUSFTA chapter on intellectual property the EU assumes a new 
obligation to protect moral rights in accordance with the Berne Convention vis-à-vis Singapore. The 
EU institutions, however, are arguably already bound to protect such rights under EU law.
113
 EUSFTA 
moral rights obligations thus arguably do not require specific EU measures. Against this background, 
and viewed in context of the Court’s jurisprudence on ‘incidentalism’, the ‘moral rights’ obligations in 
the EUSFTA could be deemed purely incidental and secondary to the predominant commercial 
objectives of the comprehensive economic rights, which are codified in the two conventions and 
incorporated in Chapter 11 EUSFTA on Intellectual Property. EUSFTA obligations on ‘moral rights’ 
are, at the same time, not ‘necessary to achieve the objective of the internal market’, as asserted by the 
AG. The provisions could, rather, be deemed as very limited in their scope and effects and thus make 
for an incidental non-commercial objective that is related but clearly secondary to the extension of 
external rights and obligations on commercial aspects of IPR protection. 
In sum, it is arguable that ‘moral rights’ within the meaning of the EUSFTA fall within the scope 
of Article 207(1) TFEU due to the possibility to enforce such rights by means of trade sanctions. In the 
alternative, the examination of the relationship between the commercial and non-commercial aspects 
of intellectual property rights protection under EUSFTA Chapter 11, read in context of the CCP 
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component of the EUSFTA, can result in the conclusion that the incidental character of the moral 
rights provisions does not affect the allocation of competences between the EU and the member states 
and thus does not merit reference to a legal basis other than Article 207 TFEU. 
5. Sustainable Development – Labour and Environmental Aspects 
In the opinion of the AG, five individual articles of Chapter 13 EUSFTA on Trade and Sustainable 
Development (Art. 13.3.1, 13.3.3, 13.4, 13.6.2 and 13.6.3 EUSFTA) fall within the scope of EU 
shared competences.
114
 These provisions concern aspects of labour and environmental policy. 
In essence, the five articles reaffirm already existing international law commitments of the parties 
in these areas (ILO Conventions, Kyoto Protocol, UNFCCC) and broadly commit the parties to 
dialogue, consultations, and cooperation in this regard. Chapter 13, moreover, is excluded from the 
agreements dispute settlement provisions but provides for government consultations and expert panels 
to solve disagreements over the implementation of the chapter.
115
 
According to the Advocate General, these five articles “essentially seek to achieve (…) minimum 
standards of labour protection and environmental protection, in isolation from their possible effects on 
trade.” Mrs. Sharpston observes, moreover, that Chapter 13 “neither impose[s] a form of trade 
conditionality (by enabling the other party to adopt trade sanctions in case of non-compliance or by 
making a specific trade benefit dependent on compliance with labour and environmental standards) 
nor otherwise regulate the use of commercial policy instruments as means to promote sustainable 
development”.116 As a result, they do not fall within the scope of Common Commercial Policy, but 
should be based on social policy objectives
117
 and environmental policy
118
 – i.e. competences shared 
with the member states.
119
  
This finding is striking in at least three regards. First, it is worth recalling that the AG applied a low 
threshold for the establishment of a ‘immediate and direct effect on international trade’ for the 
purposes of the EUSFTA chapter on competition policy. As outlined above, the notional link between 
anti-competitive practices and trade between the parties sufficed for the AG to deem EUSFTA 
competition provisions to fall within the scope of the CCP. The AG, however, does not follow the 
same logic in context the EUSFTA’s chapter on sustainable development. This is despite the fact that 
the parties, in Article 13.1(3) EUSFTA,  
“recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage trade or investment by weakening or reducing the 
protections afforded in domestic labour and environment laws.” 
Arguably, the EUSFTA provisions on labour and environmental protection – by setting out minimum 
standards to which the parties have already committed themselves in context of other multilateral 
agreements – aim at reaffirming the parties’ commitment not to lower the protections afforded to 
labour and the environment in order to gain a competitive commercial advantage. It is in this instance, 
again, that the legal facts before the Court in application of its own standards of analysis surface its 
considerable discretion. A final decision as to whether the provisions in question, read in context of 
the entire agreement, are sufficiently related to trade and investment in order to fall under the CCP is 
hardly restricted by the Court’s own – rather liberal - standards of analysis. A requirement to employ 
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empirical evidence for the ‘direct and immediate effects’ criterion may remedy this circumstance in 
the future and render respective decisions less unpredictable.  
Secondly, notwithstanding the procedural obligations on cooperation and bilateral dialogue, it is 
worth emphasizing that the EUSFTA does not oblige the parties to implement commitments that they 
have not already assumed under other international agreements. Thus, the EUSFTA only reaffirms 
such substantive commitments. Moreover, the provisions make for largely unenforceable soft law. It 
could be argued, in light of the Court’s past jurisprudence outlined further above, that the provisions in 
question are incidental and secondary to the main commercial purpose of the agreement and do not 
require reference to legal basis other than 207 TFEU. During the hearing of the proceedings, 
Rapporteur Judge Ilešič in fact enquired whether it is the Commission’s intention to advance this 
argument. 
Third, the AG appears to suggest that labour and environmental protection clauses could fall within 
the ambit of EU exclusive competence of Article 207 TFEU if they were linked to trade conditionality. 
By inference, the AG’s finding – if upheld by the Court - could inspire issue linkages for the future 
design of agreements, i.e. the establishment of an enforcement mechanism that renders benefits 
accruing to the third party contingent upon compliance on labour and environment commitments. It is 
conceivable that it suffices, for that purpose, to render the sustainable development chapter subject to 
the dispute mechanism of the respective agreement – assuming the possibility of authorized retaliation 
in case of non-compliance. 
If upheld by the Court, the Advocate General’s ‘hint’ at trade conditionality could thus still provide 
useful guidance for future ‘EU-only’ treaty-design. It is noteworthy, in this context, that the Joint 
Interpretative Instrument on CETA committed the parties “to initiating an early review of these 
provisions, including with a view to the effective enforceability of CETA provisions on trade and 
labour and trade and the environment”.120 
6. Portfolio Investment and the Prohibition of Restrictions on Capital Movement under Article 
63(1) TFEU: ‘Treaty Objective’ or ‘Common Rule’? 
A question crucial for the mode of conclusion of EU external trade and investment treaties is whether 
the EU enjoys external competence over portfolio investment at all. If so, what is the nature of that 
competence? 
The EUSFTA provisions on investment liberalization and protection follow a broad asset based 
definition of ‘investment’ and encompasses both direct and portfolio investments.121 Liberalisation, 
standards of post-entry treatment, and the dispute settlement mechanism under the EUSFTA apply to 
all investments covered by that definition. The design of the EUSFTA, in this way, corresponds to 
international practice. Both economically and in legal-technical terms, portfolio investment 
liberalization and protection standards are closely interlinked with market access and protection 
standards for foreign direct investment. Whether the EU enjoys exclusive, shared, or no competence at 
all to enter into obligations on portfolio investment thus has a great bearing for ‘EU-only’ vs. ‘mixed’ 
treaty design and the invocation of respective internal procedures. 
It is clear from the reading of 207(1) TFEU that the CCP covers ‘foreign direct investment’. 
Relevant CJEU case law, moreover offers a conceptually clear distinction between foreign direct 
investment and portfolio investment. In view of the Court, a direct investment is characterized by 
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lasting economic links that confer managerial control over an undertaking upon an investor.
122
 Indirect 
- or portfolio investments - in contrast are made “solely with the intention of making a financial 
investment without any intention to influence the management and control of the undertaking”.123 
Given the omission of portfolio – or indirect - investment from the wording of Article 207(1) TFEU, it 
clearly remains outside of the scope of the CCP.
124
 EUSFTA provisions governing portfolio 
investment could hence only fall under implied exclusive competence or EU competence shared with 
the member states, if at all. 
In the written and oral submissions, the parties consequently litigated whether and what nature of 
competence the EU enjoys over portfolio investment. The arguments focus on whether Article 63(1) 
TFEU can give rise to EU exclusive or shared competence. Article 63(1) provides that “all restrictions 
on the movement of capital between Member States and between Member States and third countries 
shall be prohibited”. In past jurisprudence, the Court held that movement of capital, within the 
meaning of Article 63(1), applies to both direct and portfolio investments.
125
 
The Commission expressed the view that the EU holds implied exclusive competence on the basis 
of Article 3(2), third ground, in conjunction with Article 63(1) and 216(1), fourth ground. 
Alternatively, the Commission argued that the EU shares competence over portfolio investment with 
the Member States. 
The AG’s analysis and conclusion on this question, however, is rather puzzling both in terms of 
structure and substance. To begin at the end, AG Sharpston concludes that portfolio investment “falls 
within the shared competences of the European Union and the Member States, on the basis of Article 
4(2) (a) and the first ground under Article 216(1) TFEU, in conjunction with Article 63 TFEU 
[emphasis added]”.126 
It appears that AG Sharpston (accidentally) errs here by invoking the first ground of Article 216(1) 
TFEU. Article 216(1) TFEU provides that “[t]he Union may conclude an agreement with one or more 
third countries or international organisations where the treaties so provide (…) [emphasis added]”. 
The first ground of Article 216(1) TFEU thus gives the Union treaty-making powers where the treaty 
explicitly allows for or mandates the conclusion of international agreements.
127
 The norm governing 
the internal and external prohibition on restrictions to capital movements, as codified in Article 63(1) 
TFEU, however, clearly does not provide for the conclusion of international agreements. 
AG Sharpston’s reference to the first ground of Article 216(1) TFEU also seems to contradict the 
argument she advances in the previous paragraphs. Here, the AG builds a case for invoking the 
Union’s shared treaty-making competence on the basis of the second ground of the same provision in 
conjunction with Article 63(1) TFEU.
128
 The second ground of Article 216(1) TFEU renders the 
Union competent to conclude an agreement with third countries “where the conclusion of an 
agreement is necessary in order to achieve, within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the 
objectives referred to in the treaties [emphasis added]”. AG Sharpston contends that “all the conditions 
for applying the second ground under Article 216(1) TFEU are satisfied here”, notably, first, the 
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existence of the treaty objective to remove external capital restrictions, and of, secondly, a competence 
to do so.
129
 
The conferral of competence to this end is a necessary condition for the applicability of Article 
216(1) TFEU, second ground. In fact, it makes for the only difference to the rule of Article 352 TFEU. 
Article 352 TFEU refers to the attainment of treaty objectives where the treaties do not provide for 
powers to do so. For Article 216(1) TFEU to be applicable, by inference, the necessity to achieve a 
treaty objective must coincide with the conferral of competence. The attainment of treaty objectives 
within the meaning of Article 21 TEU, via Article 352 TFEU, in contrast, would arguably not need to 
satisfy this condition. 
The AG does indeed find that, “[p]ursuant to Article 63 TFEU, the European Union clearly has 
competence over the liberalization and protection of types of investment other than foreign direct 
investment (…) [emphasis added]”.130 But does it?  
Chapter 4 of Title IV TFEU does in fact not provide for a Union competence for the adoption of 
secondary legislation on portfolio investment liberalization or protection, nor for the conclusion of 
external agreements to that end. It is worth recalling, too – as the AG reminds us in her introductory 
remarks - that “[t]he European Union enjoys conferred powers only. It must therefore link a measure 
which it adopts to a Treaty provision empowering it to approve that measure [emphasis added].”131 In 
regard of Article 63(1) TFEU, however, the AG treats the existence of competence and the treaty-
given possibility to exercise that competence as a distinct matter: “[i]t is not necessary that the 
European Union be competent to adopt secondary law.” For the purposes of external treaty conclusion 
within the scope of the second ground of Article 216(1) TFEU a matter must merely “fall within the 
scope of EU law and thus its competence”.132 
As such, the Advocate General interprets Article 63(1) TFEU as a treaty objective that aims at 
removing internal and external restrictions of capital movements in the future - rather than a rule 
prohibiting such restrictions per se. To achieve the objective inherent to the external dimension of the 
freedom of capital movements, it “may be necessary”, in her view, to conclude international 
agreements. 
In sum, AG Sharpston deems the rule prohibiting internal and external restrictions on capital 
movement in Article 63(1) TFEU to confer EU competence; codify a treaty-objective; and, in 
conjunction with the second ground of Article 216(1), provide for a legal basis for the exercise of EU 
external competence. 
By inference, the AG appears to argue that the corresponding internal objective codified in the 
same provision could be achieved by resorting to internal harmonization measures adopted under on 
Article 114 TFEU as well as liberalization and protection measures adopted under Article 352 TFEU. 
Indeed, these two articles are the only treaty provisions that allow for the exercise of a competence 
conferred on the basis of Article 63(1) TFEU and would thus make for a necessary logical mirror of 
the attainment of the so-deemed external objective. 
AG Sharpston’s position presents an arguable yet debatable interpretation of Article 63(1) TFEU in 
conjunction with Article 216(1) TFEU. She concludes her analysis, however, with reference to the 
first rather than the second ground of Article 216(1), which is where the coherence of her argument, in 
my view, dissolves. 
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a.) ERTA-plus? EU Competence for Portfolio Investment Liberalisation and Protection  
Assuming that the AG, in fact, intended to advance an argument on the basis of the second ground of 
Article 216(1) TFEU from the beginning to the end of her analysis, it remains nonetheless 
questionable whether Article 63(1) TFEU should be interpreted as constituting a ‘treaty objective’ – 
within the meaning of the second ground of Article 216(1) TFEU - or a ‘common rule’, within the 
meaning of the third ground of Article 3(2) TFEU and the fourth ground of Article 216(1) TFEU. 
It is worth noting, that Article 3(2) TFEU was only added to the treaty text with the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 and makes for ‘summary codification’ of the Court’s jurisprudence on 
implied powers. Senior connoisseurs of the Court’s ERTA jurisprudence have thus wondered whether 
the Court, in light of this codification, would give new meaning to its terms or “shrug its shoulders” 
and continue to apply a conventional reading of the ERTA case law post-Lisbon on a case-by-case 
basis.
133
 
In the proceedings, the Commission did indeed argue that the prohibition of restrictions on internal 
capital movements in Article 63(1) makes for a ‘common rule’ within the meaning Article 3(2) TFEU 
and pre-empted Member States’ exercise of external competence in the area of portfolio investment. 
The conclusion of member states agreements in that specific area would risk affecting the uniform 
application of the general rule prohibiting internal restrictions on capital movements codified in 
Article 63(1) TFEU. Article 63(1) TFEU in conjunction with Article 3(2) TFEU thus implied 
exclusive EU external competence over portfolio investment liberalization and protection. 
In her argument, the Commission departs from the conventional application of the ERTA 
jurisprudence, which renders the conferral of implied exclusive external competence contingent on the 
exercise of an internal competence and adoption of secondary legislation. In Opinion 2/92, for 
instance, the Court reaffirmed the conventional ERTA contingencies in that “internal competence can 
give rise to exclusive external competence only if it is exercised.”134  
The Commission argues, in contrast, that ‘common rules’, within the meaning of Article 3(2) third 
ground TFEU, do not require the exercise of an internal competence in this specific case, but take the 
shape of EU primary law.
135
 In the opinion of the Commission, the treaty-prescribed prohibition of 
capital movement restrictions between member states in Article 63(1) TFEU constitutes a ‘common 
rule’ within the meaning of Article 3(2) TFEU. The conclusion of international agreements by the 
Member States would risk affecting the uniform application of the prohibition and thus implied EU 
exclusive external powers in this area. The Commission did not, however, argue that Member States’ 
external action could alter the scope of primary law. The Union was therefore exclusively competent 
for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements covering rules on portfolio investment liberalization 
and the protection of such investments. 
AG Sharpston acknowledges the novelty of the argument that the Commission puts forward and 
agrees that “the text of Article 3(2) TFEU itself does not offer decisive guidance.”136 Yet, she finds 
that “the parties’ arguments regarding what common rules are relevant to the application of the ERTA 
principle to the area (…) of investment other than foreign direct investment suggest that there are 
various misunderstandings about ‘common rules’. The present proceedings offer an opportunity for 
the Court to provide the necessary clarification”.137 
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The AG questions why - if the Commission’s argument was correct - the treaty-drafters did not 
provide for an a priori exclusive external competence over portfolio investment in Article 3(1) 
TFEU.
138
 
Perhaps more importantly, the AG insists that implied exclusive competence can only derive from 
common rules that result from the exercise of internal competence.
139
 Hence, “in the light of the 
judgment in ERTA and subsequent case law (…) it is clear that the Commission’s broad interpretation 
of ‘common rules’ cannot be accepted.”140 Rather than examining the purpose inherent to this strand of 
jurisprudence in light of the specific question before the Court, AG Sharpston strictly rejects the 
applicability of the implied powers doctrine to primary law provisions and holds onto the formal 
elements of the ERTA doctrine.
141
 
The objective of the ERTA jurisprudence, it appears, is to establish whether the exercise of 
Member States’ competence - by concluding external agreements in a specific area - is “capable of 
undermining the uniform and consistent application of the EU rules and the proper functioning of the 
system, which they establish”.142 The AG, however, does not examine whether the conclusion of 
member states’ agreements with third countries have the potential to affect the treaty based prohibition 
of restrictions on capital movement as codified in Article 63(1) TFEU. The AG refrains from doing so 
because she treats the norm as a treaty objective, rather than a prescription. 
The AG also does not seek to explain the unique character and the (presumably existent) logic 
inherent to the treaty provisions on the freedom of capital movement: the treaty does provide for the 
exercise of Union competence under Article 63(1) in regard of the harmonization of EU legislation via 
Article 114 TFEU. Yet, the exercise of a competence to liberalize or protect portfolio investments, 
notwithstanding its conferral via Article 63(1) TFEU, is not provided for in the TFEU - neither in 
regard of the internal market nor vis-à-vis third countries. The Commission, in contrast, had explained 
this circumstance by stating that the comprehensive scope of the ‘common rule’ of Article 63(1) 
TFEU does not further require the adoption of secondary legislation. 
It seems, moreover, that the AG may overstate the potential systemic implication of the Court’s 
response to the question of ‘common rules’. The Commission did not request clarification over 
whether primary law provisions, in general, can confer implied exclusive competence. Rather, the 
Commission advanced an argument that would, if affirmed, set a precedent in regard of the nature of 
EU competence for portfolio investment, based on implied powers deriving from Article 3(2) TFEU in 
conjunction with Article 63(1) TFEU only. 
In light of these considerations, it appears that the Advocate General leaves considerable space for 
the Court to clarify the existence and nature of EU competence over the liberalization and protection 
of portfolio investment. Doubts pertain in regard of the correct legal basis for both shared or EU 
implied exclusive competence as well as the even more fundamental questions over implied powers on 
the basis of Article 3(2) in conjunction with Article 63(1) TFEU. 
A Court opinion that follows the conclusions of the AG and deems both EU and member states 
competent to conclude agreements covering portfolio investment would likely render the effective 
exercise of EU exclusive competence over foreign direct investment infeasible. The economic and 
                                                     
138
 ibid.: para 358 
139
 ibid.: para 353 
140
 ibid.: para 352 
141
 For analysis resembling this view, yet questioning the conferral of shared competence for portfolio investment, see: 
Ortino, Federico and Piet Eeckhout: Towards an EU Policy on Foreign Direct Investment, in Biondi, Eeckhout, Ripley 
(eds): ‘EU Law after Lisbon’, OUP 2012. pp 315-318 
142
 Opinion 2/13: para 74 
Reading Opinion 2/15: Standards of Analysis, the Court’s Discretion, and the Legal View of the Advocate General 
 35 
 
legal-technical link between direct and indirect investment does not seem to offer an opportunity for 
the separation of the two areas of regulation into distinct external agreements.  
The EU could thus seek to conclude ‘EU-only’ agreements including investment provisions as a 
whole, subject to the political discretion of EU institutions, or accept a conclusion of future EU trade 
and investment treaties as mixed agreements. In the alternative, exclusive CCP agreements, on the one 
hand, and ‘mixed’ agreements on investment (and transport services), on the other, could be concluded 
separately. 
IV. Conclusions 
The Opinion 2/15 proceedings surface the vast amount of general and issue specific legal questions 
that lay beneath the request of the Commission for the Court to clarify EU competence for the 
conclusion of the EUSFTA. Some of these questions are of methodological character and demand a 
clarification of the Court’s general approaches to competence and legal basis enquiries, as well as of 
its precise understanding of the relationship between the two. A considerable number of issues can be 
considered as genuinely novel, however, as they arise as a result of the Lisbon Treaty reform of 2009. 
The examination of the Court’s analytical approaches to the delimitation of exclusive vs. shared 
external Union competences, in general, and the CCP, more specifically, results in the conclusion that 
the Court has exercised and retains considerable discretion in deciding on competence and legal basis 
enquiries regarding acts concluding EU external agreements. The parameters the Court has considered 
or emphasized in its past reviews cannot be said to have advanced significant clarity or predictability 
of their appropriate application on a case-by-case basis. The Opinion 2/15 proceeding may offer a 
unique yet challenging opportunity for the Court to refine its analytical standards and approaches with 
a view to generating legal certainty beyond the ambit of facts specific to the case. The Court’s 
judgment in Opinion 2/15 thus has a significant potential to reduce the incentives for litigation and 
decrease transaction costs of governance, which derive from uncertainties inherent to EU primary 
legal institutions as well as from uncertainty over the Court’s analytical focus. 
Such clarifications could, first, include a more refined operationalization of the ‘direct and 
immediate effects on international trade’ criterion of the CCP ‘aims and content’ test, which should 
arguably require reference to empirical evidence – in contrast to establishing mere notional links - in 
order to guarantee a more consistent, coherent, and hence valuable application. The fluidity of the 
concept of ‘trade effects’ of treaty content, admittedly, renders such an exercise particularly difficult. 
Secondly, it seems that the Court’s past jurisprudence has not served to systematically clarify the 
precise relationship between external competences and the attribution the appropriate legal basis – or 
bases - for acts concluding EU external agreements, which pursue multiple purposes and/or encompass 
more than one discernable component. The Court’s jurisprudence provides for anecdotal evidence of 
factors employed in the determination of the main or predominant purpose of the acts in question. It 
cannot be said, however, that the Court has set out ‘objective factors amenable to judicial review’ for 
the determination of predominant vs. incidental objectives and components of such acts. It is at the 
intersection of the legal basis test and the competence enquiry where the Court’s judgment could and 
should provide for enhanced clarity so as to avoid the sort of confusion that is reflected in the 
diverging member states’ responses to the legal basis enquiry placed before them by the Court in this 
proceeding. 
Third, Opinion 2/15 generates an important opportunity for the Court to clarify the codification of 
implied powers under Article 3(2) TFEU in light of its ERTA jurisprudence, with specific and lasting 
relevance for the answer to the question whether the Union is externally competent – and if so, in what 
nature – to conclude external agreements covering portfolio investment liberalization and protection. 
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AG Sharpston’s legal view affirms the tectonic shifts of competence, which the Lisbon Treaty 
reform has advanced and the Court’s judgment in Daiichi Sankyo has begun to confirm. The vast 
majority of EUSFTA provisions and commitments will fall to EU exclusive competence, including the 
contentious investment dispute settlement mechanism. Her submission, however, also indicates that 
the EUSFTA and other ‘new generation’ FTAs, in the current form, cannot be concluded as mandatory 
‘EU-only’ agreements. Provisions on the termination of member states BITs as well as air, maritime, 
and inland-waterway transport services commitments are, rather obviously, not included in the scope 
of EU exclusive competence. Deleting the redundant ‘BIT termination clause’ and the negotiation of 
separate ‘mixed’ transport agreements can, however, remedy this circumstance in a technically facile 
and politically uncontentious manner. 
The same, however, cannot be said about the agreement’s non-commercial provisions on labour 
and environmental protection standards, which the AG deems to fall under competences shared with 
the Member States. It is questionable at least, however, whether the Court will eventually side with the 
AG on this matter. Both the precise application of the ‘direct effects on international trade’ criterion 
and the determination of ‘incidental’ treaty components could conceivably move the needle on the 
scope of exclusive external competence for these provisions. Be that as it may, the AG’s opinion does 
suggest another remedy to avoid mixity in this instance, notably by linking compliance to the 
availability of trade benefits under future agreements. The availability of trade sanctions would 
establish a sufficiently specific relationship to trade and thus move labour and environmental 
protection provisions within the exclusive scope of EU Common Commercial Policy. It is noteworthy 
that this process is – at the political level – already underway with respect to the CETA.143  
The Court may apply similar considerations to the issue of ‘moral rights’ for intellectual property, 
which makes for another area where the Court may exercise the discretion it retains with respect to the 
analytical approaches it employs. The AG, in this instance, found that moral rights, in context of the 
EUSFTA would serve to harmonize the laws of the member states to improve the functioning of the 
internal market, rather than being sufficiently related to trade to enter the realm of the CCP; or making 
for an incidental component of the act concluding the EUSFTA. At minimum, this finding is 
surprising in light of the fact that the rights in question are enforceable via trade sanctions that are 
available under the EUSFTA. 
Portfolio investment, which the AG deems to fall under EU shared competence, may create the 
greatest challenge for the future design of EU-only trade and investment agreements. It appears, 
however, that the Advocate General has left considerable space for authoritative clarification in regard 
of the existence and nature of EU competence in this area. The opinion of AG does not seem to 
eliminate doubts over the correct legal basis for both conceivable scenarios, i.e. shared or implied EU 
exclusive competence over portfolio investment on the basis of Article 63(1) TFEU. 
A Court opinion that follows the conclusions of the AG and deems both EU and member states 
competent to conclude agreements covering portfolio investment would likely render the effective 
exercise of EU exclusive competence over foreign direct investment infeasible. The economic and 
legal-institutional links between direct and indirect investments does not seem to offer an opportunity 
for the separation of the two regulatory areas into distinct external agreements. The EU could seek to 
conclude ‘EU-only’ agreements including investment provisions as a whole, subject to the political 
discretion of EU institutions, or accept the conclusion of mixed agreements. In the alternative, the 
Union could opt for the separate conclusion of exclusive CCP agreements, on the one hand, and 
‘mixed’ agreements on investment and transport, on the other. 
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Only the Court’s final verdict will end the legal uncertainty over the existence and nature of EU 
competences in these areas and give authoritative guidelines for the design of EU external trade and 
investment agreements. It is true that the Court tends to follow the legal views expressed by the 
respective AG. Yet, the sheer number, complexity, novelty, and systemic significance of the issues at 
stake, as well as the rare sitting of the Court in full session of 28 judges, may render this proceeding 
unlike others.  
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